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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comparison of the military coups d’état that occurred in Thailand in 1991 
and 2006.  The thesis explores how Thailand’s military acts as a political army and 
determines the combination of factors necessary for the military to step into the political 
system.  A historic narrative from the kingdom’s ancient beginnings, through the 1932 
coup d’état that overthrew the absolute monarchy, to the 1980s established the founding 
principles of the military and its historical role in politics, both of which contribute to the 
values and identity of Thailand’s military as an institution.  The comparison of the pre-
coup periods to the events that lead directly to the coup reveal a common set of factors 
necessary for the military to stage a successful coup.  Specifically, these factors include 
political stalemate, affronts to values, and direct threats to interests.  Additionally, the 
two cases demonstrate how Thailand’s military is compelled to act as a political army due 
to the birthright principle, civilian incompetence, and military competence.  The thesis 
concludes with some recommendations for the United States in its relationship with 
Thailand with the better understanding of why these coups occur.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
At first glance, Thailand’s coups of 1991 and 2006 appear to have been business 
as usual.  After all, Thailand has experienced 18 successful military coups since the end 
of the last absolute monarchy in 1932, and has been subject to several other unsuccessful 
attempts.  What makes these two most recent coups different is that both were regime 
changes away from democratically elected governments, whereas the preceding coups 
primarily changed the military faction and leader in government.  The first took place 
after a decade of gradual changes of democratization, the second after several changes of 
government through competitive elections and the implementation of a strongly 
democratic constitution promulgated in 1997. 
Why did the Thai military intervene in 1991 and 2006 to take over the political 
process by replacing civilian executive leaders with its generals after significant strides 
toward consolidating democracy, the seemingly widespread adoption of democratic 
values in Thai society, development of a significant middle class, and expansion of 
private business interests and wealth?  What implication might this have for theories 
about civil-military relations in general and about coups d’état more specifically?  This 
thesis seeks to explain the drastic and successful intervention of the Thai military into 
politics at these two junctures and considers what this means for Thailand’s political path 
in the near- to mid-term.  In doing so, it tests two theories about why military coups occur 
and why some succeed, helping build knowledge about civil-military relations in 
democratizing states.  
The dependent variable of this study is the presence and outcome of a military 
coup that resulted in military rule of one year or longer.  Independent variables will be 
drawn from recent studies that suggest military coups are the result of a complex mix of 
structural, cultural, and rational choice conditions.  Factors drawn from structural and 
cultural literatures are used to support the primary role of identity theory for the Thai 
military.  Using the cases of Thai military coups of 1991 and 2006 as examples, this 
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thesis identifies which combination of factors is necessary and sufficient in determining 
why, when, and how the military intervenes into politics.  By incorporating the periods of 
apparent democratic consolidation prior to each coup, this thesis also identifies periods 
when coups do not occur because the sufficient conditions are yet not present.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
Thailand is the world’s twenty-fifth largest economy by GDP and the twentieth-
largest population.1  As a key regional partner of the United States in Southeast Asia for 
the past 60 years, Thailand is also a significant contributor to regional institutions such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has been held up as a solid 
example of democratization in the region.  Over the past 30 years, Thailand’s society and 
economy have experienced rapid change, growth, and modernization as a result of 
embracing globalization and export-driven economic growth.  Thailand was heavily 
involved in the Vietnam War as a U.S. base and aligned itself U.S. policies.  The changes 
in Thailand have included increased urbanization, higher levels of education, a rising 
middle class and private business wealth, exposure to Western values, and more 
horizontally structured civil-society organizations.  The changes are closely associated 
with the development of democratic institutions.2  These appeared to set Thailand on the 
path to becoming a modern nation-state with clear civilian control over the military.   
The deposing of democratically elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by the 
Thai military in 2006, however, demonstrated that coups are not yet a thing of Thailand’s 
past.  Global studies of coups and subsequent military rule, even for brief periods of time, 
indicate that Thailand is likely to face less freedom, more injustice, and less prosperity, 
none of which serve in the national security interests of the United States.3  These  
 
                                                 
1 CIA World Factbook, “East and Southeast Asia: Thailand,” September 2010, Central Intelligence 
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html (accessed September 19, 
2010).  
2 Larry Jay Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), 18–31. 
3 Peter Karsten (Ed.), “The Coup d’Etat in Competitive Democracies: Its Appropriateness, Its Causes 
and Its Avoidance,” in Civil Military Relations, 223–250 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998). 
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unexpected developments and the ongoing civil unrest since the 2006 coup raise doubts 
about whether Thailand can become a competitive democracy when military takeovers 
remain a distinct possibility.   
Understanding the last two coups in Thailand has broader implications for the role 
of the military in governance and society in democratizing states, civil-military relations, 
and the future of political stability in Thailand.  In comparing the coups of 1991 and 
2006, this thesis contributes to our knowledge about the reasoning and conditions that 
precipitate coups and the subsequent impact on the future of governance.  While the 
literature on why coups occur is relatively abundant, there is still a gap in understanding 
why they occur in middle-income states like Thailand that have experienced some 
democratic consolidation.  Similarly, there is still much to learn about why coups occur in 
states that have experienced a fair degree of modernization, which is characterized by a 
broadly accepted, state-driven nationalism, highly differentiated bureaucracy, and 
industrialization.  
This thesis explores what factors within Thai society permitted intervention by the 
military so directly in politics, so recently in the kingdom’s history.  What is the identity 
of the military that leads it to view itself as the ultimate guarantor of Thai society?  How 
does the Thai military define a professional force?  Has it adopted the modern notion of 
military separation from policymaking and an outward focus to national security?  Or 
does it, as militaries in developing states tend to do, imagine itself as a critical 
modernizing force and a primary protector of nascent democratic institutions?   
In the traditional view, the officers of modern militaries seek to be professionals 
in the management of violence.4  According to Samuel Huntington, professionalism lends 
itself to objective civilian control, and the military’s intervention in the political process 
is the antithesis of a professional force.5  Other theories about civil-military relations, 
especially in developing nations, recognize some position for the military in the political 
                                                 
4  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 534. 
5  Ibid. 
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process.6  What is this role and how much of the political process should include the 
military?  How do the two most recent cases of coups in Thailand fit the theories of civil-
military relations and military coups d’état? 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The most significant challenge with studying military coups in Thailand is 
identifying the military mindsets that precipitated each coup.  This step will require an 
understanding of the Thai military identity and the role of civil-military relations in 
Thailand.  Linked to this is the difficulty of sorting public narratives from personal 
beliefs and calculations.  The relative freedom of the press in Thailand, and the very 
public nature of recent political contestation through the media, to some degree help 
overcome these challenges to understanding the 2006 coup.  Secondary sources and rich 
analysis since the 1991 coup aid in understanding the military identity and roles present 
before and during this earlier event. Interviews with some of the key players in each coup 
and experts on Thai military, culture, and politics will help separate public rhetoric from 
core beliefs.  
This thesis hypothesizes that the broadly conceived and accepted role of the 
military within Thailand’s society, political institutions, and economy shapes its 
perception about the necessity of intervention in politics.  This thesis begins by 
identifying the role of the military in Thai politics, society, economy, and security.  This 
foundation develops an understanding of the Thai military identity.  By exploring the 
military’s history, political activity, and composure, this thesis attempts to present an 
understanding of how the military perceived the situation at the time of the 1991 and 
2006 coups.  This identity is shaped by various influences of Thai society—the 
monarchy, an elite class of military leaders, and rising influence from the middle class 
and private business interests—and by the operations of the military, which are mostly 
domestic.  Also, this thesis hypothesizes that the identity of the Thai military and its role 
of Thai society will sustain the military’s place in Thai politics in the near term.  
                                                 
6 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 
1960). 
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With some understanding about the military’s identity, thus generated, this thesis 
applies two theories about coups d’état to support the developed concept of identity.  
Karsten’s analysis suggests five causes for coups, including economic distress, political 
corruption, political stalemate, affronts to military values, and direct threats to military 
interests.  Koonings and Krujit offer reasons for intervention based on national history, 
military competence, and civilian incompetence.  By applying these factors in the cases 
of Thailand’s 1991 and 2006 coups, this thesis presents a better understanding of the 
structural conditions and mindsets that can lead to a coup in Thailand.  The causes for 
these coups have implications for civil-military relations in Thailand and indicate when 
the military will intervene in Thai politics.  Understanding the conditions and mindsets 
for when the military intervenes into politics will support the reasoning for why the 
military will continue to play a significant role in those politics.  These theories are 
supported by the two cases of this study.  In Thailand in 1991 and 2006, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the coups resulted from a specific combination of Karsten’s 
causes for coups and the reasons to act as a political army from Koonings and Krujit.   
Finally, this thesis explores the implications of these understandings on the future 
of Thai governance.  This thesis hypothesizes that the people and the military of Thailand 
have yet to reach agreement about the legitimacy of liberal democracy as the right and 
proper regime for their society; despite trappings of modernity, several factors about 
traditional Thai society, especially the perceived role of the law, legal institutions, and the 
monarchy, will continue to complicate attempts to reach a new state-society agreement 
that could relegate coups to Thai history. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Thailand has a unique history within the developing world.  David Wyatt’s 
Thailand: A Short History provides a foundational timeline of this history up to the early 
1980s.7  The book captures the formation of the various Tai cultures in Southeast Asia, 
the first kingdom that developed in the fourteenth century, and the widest area of Siamese 
sovereignty as consolidated by King Rama III in 1850.  The growth of Thai nationalism 
                                                 
7 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
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and exposure to new ideas after WWI led by King Rama VI brought an end to the 
absolute monarchy with the first military coup in 1932.  This event also began the 
military’s role of bringing modernization to the Thai people.  This history also includes 
the renaming of the state to Thailand from the more inclusive Siam, the restoration of a 
central role for the monarchy under the current king, and the inauguration of current 
senior statesman General Prem Tinsulanond as civilian Prime Minister from 1980–1988 
and a major influence since through his role on the Privy Council. 
The nationalism that started under Rama VI contained the three central tenets of 
Thai national identity that persist today: nation, religion, and monarchy.  The facets of 
Thai identity are explored in Craig Reynolds’s National Identity and its Defenders: 
Thailand Today.8  This collection of essays explores the development and current state of 
what it is to be Thai.  This contrasts with the other ethnicities and cultures present in 
Thailand.  Duncan McCargo and Supara Janchitfah, for instance, explore the distinct 
culture of Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand and how difficult it has been for the state 
to assimilate them into Thai society.9  The Malay-Muslims in Thailand’s south, and other 
ethnic minorities elsewhere, have suffered from the unicultural nationalist policies of a 
Bangkok-centralized identity of the central Thai people, who were more concerned about 
the Chinese business elite in Bangkok than the cultures and governance of the periphery.   
Thai nationalism has impacted the role of the military in Thailand.  Particularly, 
the elite in Thailand shape the concept of national security, so the role of the military 
evolves as the membership of the elite changes.10  The monarchy has had a strong impact 
on the military and its politics.  While the king maintains a paternal role over Thai 
society, Paul Handley explores the politically active role the king has pursued, including 
                                                 
8 Craig J. Reynolds (ed.), National Identity and its Defenders: Thailand Today (Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books, 2002).  
9  Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 235; Supara Janchitfah, Violence in the Mist: Reporting on the Presence of 
Pain in Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Asia Foundation, 2004). 
10  Panitan Wattanayagorn, “Thailand: The Elite's Shifting Conceptions of Security,” in Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
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in the coups of 1991 and 2006.11  The roles of the monarchy and military in Thai politics 
contrasts with the appearances that Thailand had been moving toward liberal democracy 
with the appropriate civilian control over the military.  By most appearances, the military 
returned to the barracks after the 1991 coup while the country gradually transitioned to 
civilian political leadership.  After the 1997 Constitution, civilian authority over the Thai 
military appeared to be even stronger and coups a distant memory.12   
In addition to reviewing how Thai history and national identity have shaped the 
role of the military, theories about civil-military relations and coups will be applied to the 
case of Thailand.  Samuel Huntington describes an ideal type of a professional military 
force.13  This professionalism is best served under the balance of military and civilian 
political power that creates the sense of objective control:  “The antithesis of objective 
civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the 
military become progressively involved in institutional, class and constitutional 
politics.”14  Huntington also defines an understanding of the “military mind” as the 
common characteristics of the attitudes and ethics for professional military officers.  
These professional soldiers come to act as “civil servants in uniform.”  This ideal type of 
professional military, however, is mostly applied to a relatively few developed nations, 
with the exception of India, Mexico and a handful of others.  The ideas presented by 
Huntington also benefit from the updated work by Suzanne Neilsen and Don Snider, 
which provides insights from events since Huntington’s seminal publication.15  These 
works suggest a strong role for military identity, as well as for structural conditions such 
as democratization and economic development. 
                                                 
11  Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lib/nps/Doc?id=10169993, 
(accessed September 19, 2010). 
12 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Coercion and 
Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001); Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of 
Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005). 
13  Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80. 
14  Ibid., 83. 
15  Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the 
State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
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Morris Janowitz develops the idea of a constabulary force that is ready to support 
the interests of the nation with the full range of military operations along with externally 
directed diplomacy.  Although Janowitz applies this concept to international relations,16 
his work also provides contributions to the role of the military in developing nations and 
acknowledges that some military juntas take political control of the country in order to 
modernize the nation.  With the goal of modernization comes the warning that “the 
military must be able to do more than merely conserve its power.”17  Janowitz also 
concludes that “that the form of political participation which military regimes permit and 
encourage directly influences the extent and viability of the trend toward the 
civilianization of military regimes.”18  Like Huntington, his explanations for the level of 
professionalization of the military in developing states are generally ideological and 
structural. 
Through quantitative analysis of 33 cases, Peter Karsten examines why military 
coups occur.  He finds that in states where some democratic consolidation has occurred, 
coups tend to include some necessary, but not sufficient, causes.19  According to Karsten, 
a combination of economic distress, political corruption, political stalemate, affronts to 
military corporate values, and threats to military corporate interests are the foundations 
that lead to coups.20  He concludes with several recommendations for how states can 
avoid future coups.  While this work makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the factors that contribute to military coups, its weakness lies in not 
assigning priority to these factors.  
                                                 
16  Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 12. 
17  Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, Expanded edition 
of The Military in the Political Development of New Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 
180. 
18  Henry Bienen, The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1968), 5. 
19  Peter Karsten, Civil-Military Relations (New York: Garland Pub., 1998), 223. 
20  Ibid., 225. 
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Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit provide some background for the development of 
a political army and insight into the military’s role in intervening in politics.21  Political 
militaries derive their purpose for steering the national destiny from three basic 
principles: birthright, competence, and civilian inadequacy.  By the “birthright” principle, 
the foundational myth that the military institution was present at the birth of the nation 
leads to strong forms of identification within the military to the nation, its principles and 
it values.  The “competence principle” incorporates the resources and structure of the 
military to claim that it is best positioned to care for national interests, given its 
capability, organizational characteristics, and identity with the nation.  The “principle of 
civilian inadequacy” stresses the divided nature and inefficiencies of civilian politicians 
and claims “states can only rely on force and loyalty; so it has the armed forces as its sole 
and ultimate guarantor.”22  These principles as “generic notions are transformed into 
specific military doctrines that not only offer motivation and legitimacy to military 
intervention in politics, but also provide specific strategic guidance with respect to the 
form, content and timing of such interventions.”23  These formational principles for a 
political army will be applied to Thailand to help explain its actions as a political force.  
The weakness of this study is that only a few cases are available that demonstrate a 
transition within the military to accepting civilian rule, even as the pressure to 
democratize increases. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Approaching a better understanding of recent Thai history, military identity and 
its role in civil-military relations, and structural conditions requires a diverse set of 
materials.  This thesis will conduct a comparative study of Thailand’s coups of 1991 and 
2006 carried out by reviewing and analyzing the literature and reporting associated with 
Thailand before, during, and immediately after these events.  Sufficient English-language 
literature is available on each of these coups.  Most address the coups separately, 
                                                 
21  Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of 
Democracy (London; New York: Zed Books, 2002). 
22  Ibid., 19. 
23  Ibid., 21. 
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evaluating the causes and outcomes of each independently.  This thesis approaches this 
literature in combination with an understanding of the Thai military identity, derived 
from historic analysis and evaluation of current trends.  Interviews conducted in Thailand 
with former generals, current government officials, democratization experts, leading 
scholars, and U.S. Embassy personnel added information about the events.  The research 
travel was limited to Bangkok, thus lacking the complete national perspective; however, 
the co-location of the relevant personnel to interview indicated the centrality of Bangkok 
to the political system and the events of this study.  Further, walking around Bangkok and 
meeting with middle-class and politically connected people reinforced the political views 
in the literature and provided context for opinions and specific events. 
With the two coups having occurred only 15 years apart, the events of the first 
may have had an impact on the events in the second.  However, the 1997 “People’s 
Constitution” provides a significant marker for dividing the periods.  The periods of 
review include a period of apparent democratic consolidation and the coup that followed.  
The era of Prime Minister Prem, which saw a military-led transition to a more democratic 
regime, provides a framework for the coup of 1991 and shapes the outcomes and 
responses by the people and the government.  
The 1997 Constitution came at a time of financial crisis and was a major 
milestone in the Kingdom’s transition toward greater democratization.  Instead of 
producing a coup near that tumultuous time, as Karsten and others would predict, 
Thailand experienced nearly a decade of increased political participation.  Instead, it 
appears that the changes in the political climate in Thailand after the 1997 Constitution 
gradually created the conditions that formed the basis for the coup of 2006.  The decade 
or so of developments prior to each coup shaped the conditions for the events that 
occurred in the six months just prior to each coup.    
The coups of both 1991 and 2006 are compared in how they fit to the conditions 
presented by Koonings and Krujit, and Karsten.  Each section of this thesis explores how 
Thailand’s military acted as Koonings and Krujit describe as a political army: the 
birthright principle, civilian incompetence, and military competence.  The identity of 
Thailand’s military exhibits the birthright principle before each coup, and the political 
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conditions at the time provide the structural reasons for the military to make its decisions.  
The sections also explain how Karsten’s factors combine to cause each coup.  The values 
of the military are associated with its identity, which in each case aligns with the 
traditional elites that dominated the political process.  The interests of the military leaders 
are manifestations of those values and, in particular for each coup, are associated with 
military promotions.  Political stalemate results from the elected government’s inability 
to retain political power and is operationlized in cabinet turnovers and constitutional 
deadlock.  In comparing Thailand’s two most recent coups conditions that are common 
and different between the coups are identified.  Without attempting to construct a strict 
chart, some understanding about the sufficient and necessary conditions that cause Thai 
military coups emerges.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will proceed as follows.  Chapter II explores the history of Thailand as 
a kingdom from its historic roots in the thirteenth century CE through the 1980s.  This 
history includes the origins of the military as a support for the monarchy and later an 
extensive involvement of the military in the modern political structure.  The history 
establishes some initial thematic elements for the military values and its identity.  The 
role and identity of the military contributes to the cultural context of the two coups of this 
study.   
Chapter III explores the conditions surrounding the 1991 coup.  After a period of 
a semi-democratic political structure was introduced in the 1980s, an elected official 
entered the office of Prime Minister in 1988 with the political support of business 
interests and appeared to mark the initiation of democracy in the political system.  After 
three years, the traditionally minded military leaders asserted control over the political 
process and ousted the elected leaders.  Several conditions combined to make the coup 
successful.  The military remained a political force, unchecked from asserting its 




incompetence and political stalemate opened the opportunity for the military to step in.  
The military leaders, identifying with their historical role within the political system, 
stepped in.  
Chapter IV explores the conditions surrounding the 2006 coup.  Thaksin 
Shinawatra entered the office of Prime Minister under a democratic electoral system that 
enabled a strong executive role.  During Thaksin’s administration, the system collapsed 
into a constitutional deadlock as a result of the corrupted electoral process and 
independent bodies intended to oversee the political system, and abuse of the authority of 
the executive office for personal gain and security concerns.  The military leaders were 
re-politicized by Thaksin’s involvement in the promotions process, and one faction 
preferred the system as run by the network monarchy led by Prem.  With the political 
stalemate, the re-politicized military felt compelled to step in again.   
Chapter V summarizes the findings and explains whether the results support the 
hypotheses, namely that military identity is one of the most important factors, but not the 
only one, driving coups in Thailand.  The chapter includes a critical assessment of the 
applicability of the two theories tested on Thailand and lists the necessary factors that in 
combination are sufficient for a coup to occur.  The conclusion, in light of the research, 
has implications for the future possibilities of democracy and coups in Thailand.  
Additionally, the chapter includes implications and some recommendations for the 
United States’ policies toward Thailand considering the coups and possible domestic 




II. THE HISTORY AND CORPORATE VALUES OF 
THAILAND’S MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The coups in Thailand that occurred in 1991 and 2006 were not random events or 
irrational actions by military leaders.  Both of these coups occurred in a social and 
political context that permitted the action to occur in a rational manner and with an 
expectation of success.  The political and social context of governance in Thailand that 
permitted such coups has shaped and been shaped by the corporate values of Thailand’s 
military.  The corporate values of Thailand’s military are here assessed by a review of the 
military’s continued involvement in governance from its beginning in 1932 to the period 
preceding the 1991 coup.   
Through a historical review of the military’s origins and involvement in national 
governance since 1932, this thesis identifies three themes of interrelated values for 
Thailand’s military.  First, Thailand’s military has been a political organization.  Second, 
the military supports the traditional institution of the monarchy and in particular its long 
reigning, charismatic King Bhumibol Adulyadej as a source of political legitimacy for 
Thailand.  Finally, the military’s concept of national security extends beyond the defense 
of national borders, and the leadership’s notion of professionalism supports this concept.  
All of these themes are interrelated in their causes and implications.  The actions taken by 
Thailand’s military are best understood in the context of these themes and their 
interrelationship. 
Assessing the values of Thailand’s military requires a review of its origins and an 
understanding of its sense of professionalism.  According to Koonings and Krujit, 
political militaries derive their purpose for steering the national destiny from three basic 
principles: birthright, competence, and civilian inadequacy.  “The ‘birthright 
principle’…implies that the military are perceived to have been at the birth of the 
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nation.”24  This principle generally refers to militaries that developed to fight for 
independence from a colonizing power, but the state of Thailand in Asia is unique in the 
context of colonialism, having never been formally colonized by an external power.  The 
origins of Thailand’s military, however, are just as influential on its corporate values in 
making it a political army.  In addition to its origins, the Thai sense of professionalism 
among the military leaders also calls them to political action.  In “Affronts To The 
Military’s Values,” Karsten explains that generals educated alongside civilian elites 
conclude that the military’s responsibilities include national development; so 
“professional” officers are called to political action.25  Thomas applies a similar 
understanding to Thailand within a framework that links professionalism with 
corporatism seeking to maximize autonomy and to formulate as well as implement 
national security policy.26  The following historical review of Thailand explores how a 
political army emerged and how professionalism as defined by this military permits and 
requires continued involvement in politics.   
The actions of Thailand’s military may benefit the organization in terms of 
immediate interests, but the interests themselves are influenced by the deeper values of 
the organization.  Values emerge from a culture, a social and, in this case, a political 
context that assigns meanings to ideas and actions.  Values, based on cultural context, 
represent what is important beyond the immediate benefit and tend to have perceived 
long-term implications.  This thesis determines that the values for Thailand’s military 
include particular meanings for the country’s political structure and the military’s role 
within that structure.  Interests refer to the more immediate consequences of a situation 
and the near-term results of actions.  Situations for interests include budgets, promotions, 
operations, and the like.  Interests have costs and benefits of their own on which the  
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actors make contingent decisions, but they exist in a structure of values that influence 
those tradeoffs.  By assessing the values of Thailand’s military, its interests are better 
understood within their context. 
Fitting particular events into categories of interest or value becomes cumbersome 
and misleading.  Rather than attempting to define specific criteria for interests and values, 
which are so closely related, “structured contingency” provides a framework for the two 
to influence each other.  (The goal of this thesis is not to determine whether the chicken 
or egg came first, but to assess how the egg-laying process affects later iterations.)  As 
Bratton and van de Walle explain, “Attention to a structured contingency approach 
allows, on the one hand, that structural precedents impart shape to current events, and on 
the other, private decisions change even durable public institutions.”27   
Thailand’s military was created by and continues to exist within a particular social 
and political context, which shapes its values and interests.  Given the prominent role the 
military has taken within Thailand’s governance, however, the organization in turn 
influences the institutions of governance.  This relationship of structure to contingency 
exists in a wider context of the nature of the relationship of state to the society and 
society’s acceptance of regime and ruler.  As Young phrases it: 
By regime I understand a given political formula for the exercise of state 
rule…A regime develops a logic of its own, whose ultimate aim is the 
reproduction over time of its particular configuration of institutional 
arrangements and dominant ideas…The ruler has yet a different logic: to 
remain in power.28   
This thesis identifies the key political events that determine the political context of later 
actions.  In this series of events, values become evident and provide context and structure 
to actors whose interests affect their contingent actions.    
Reviewing the history of Thailand’s military, particularly its role in governance, 
reveals several corporate values and its role as a political military.  How Thailand’s 
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military came into being and the role it has in Thailand shapes its actions and its outlook.  
As a political organization, Thailand’s military supports the political structure centered 
on a traditional, albeit constitutional, monarchy.  Supporting this structure requires action 
beyond defending national borders to include taking an active role in national 
development and thus politics.  The military’s sense of professionalism includes 
responsibility for supporting the social and political structure, and this sense of duty thus 
shapes the military’s actions.   
B. ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE ROLE OF ELITES 
The role of Thailand’s elites dominates Thailand’s history.  The individual rulers 
of Thailand’s ancient and modern history had so much power that they materially 
affected the lives of the people.29  In the fifteenth century kingdom of Ayudhya, a Tai 
king built the sakdi na system on long-established common law principles within the 
kingdom and enacted a series of laws that for every person delineated a very specified 
social hierarchy, codifying elite status.30  After its Burman neighbors destroyed the 
Kingdom of Ayudhya in 1767, a new kingdom of Siam arose in its place.  Since 1782, 
under Rama I, Siam has centered rule in Bangkok.31  Consolidation of the widest area of 
influence over Tai and other peoples occurred under King Rama III by 1850, when 
threats would come no longer from Tai people and their neighbors but from French, 
British, and Dutch colonizers in Burma, the Malay peninsula, and Indochina.32  In Siam, 
like elsewhere in eighteenth century Southeast Asia, political leadership focused more on 
control over the population than the territory: “Ordinary Siamese were divided into two 
types of clients (phrai), royal and nonroyal.  As such they were registered to serve their 
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king or their princely and noble patrons.”33  Appointment of government ministers 
oversaw the movement of people and protected the king’s interests.34  
Siam’s king eventually adopted modern, bureaucratic forms to enact its power.  
Because the new state institutions were developed by the elites, they were founded on 
traditional institutions that legitimated the king’s power.  King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) 
in 1873 began reforms with a vision to modernize Siam to a bureaucratic state with a 
Buddhist morality that could still meet the standards of the West: “All [reforms] directly 
or indirectly strengthened the king’s political position…  Only much later did the king 
begin to realize the contradiction inherent in this vision.”35  In these reforms 
Chulalongkorn instituted the forms of the modern state, but appointing royal family 
members in a traditional patron-client relationship undermined the creation of a rational-
legal state.  Modernizing the bureaucracy through centralized, patrimonial politics 
threatened the interests of traditional elites outside of the monarchy; but wholly rational-
legal reforms were believed to be a threat to the political structure centered on the 
monarch and supported by the Buddhist Sangha and military.  The identification with the 
central authority is still relevant today for social institutions like the state, the monarchy, 
and the Sangha, because the national identity and the sources of legitimacy in Thailand 
derive their meanings from their proximity to the central authority.36  The central 
authority of the elites in Thailand are, in return, legitimated and strengthened by the 
national institutions. 
The religious institution of Theravada Buddhism remains central to Thai national 
identity and influences the political structure even today.  The history of the Thais roots 
itself in the history of Buddhism, gradually shifted to the Tai dynasties, and ultimately to 
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modern Thai nationalism.37  The religious construct shapes how the people perceive 
political leaders.  From the Buddhist tradition, the Thai concept of thammasat—the social 
contract of kingship—endows the political leader with the dharma that will ensure his 
one day becoming a Buddha, so the political leader is the de facto moral leader with some 
divine legitimacy.38  Mongkut, the monk turned monarch, shifted the cosmology of 
Theravada Buddhism toward humankind’s having an active role in shaping the world 
order: “He thus opened the possibility that some aspects of the world might not simply be 
accepted as reflections of an unchanging cosmology but might be changed by humans 
through application of knowledge of nature.”39  This shift in the religion solidified the 
patrimonial role of the monarch by connecting him to the future of the society.  Such a 
foundation for the political role of the monarchy embeds the responsibility of leadership 
over the society into the monarchy, and the endowment of this religious role to the 
monarchy elevates his position within the society.  With legitimacy of the monarchy 
connected to religious identity, longevity, and perceived uniqueness of the Thai state, the 
monarchy of Thailand has deep roots within the society and has intermingled 
responsibilities in the religious, social, and political aspects of the national identity.  
Legitimacy for Thailand’s monarchy today still extends from the “merit and virtue” of 
those who belong to the royal lineage.40 
The Thai military came into being to support this centralized structure.  From the 
roots of the eighteenth century, “the Siamese system closely associated, if it did not 
merge, military and civil interests; the Thai work for government minister (senabodi) 
originally meant army general.”41  Under the absolute monarchy that interacted with the 
colonial powers in the nineteenth century, “Despite the Western structure, discipline and 
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ethics being taught at the academies, the emerging modern Thai army resembled Western 
militaries of an earlier era in certain respects: promotion and even admission to the 
officer corps depended on [social or political] status.”42  Connections to the royal family, 
government officials, and military officers were necessary for entry into the military 
academies; and the highest positions in the military were reserved for the royal family.43  
The patrimonial governance also applied to the military, too.  The military that emerged 
by the twentieth century was a political force shaped by the colonial environment 
surrounding it.  The Thai military did not fight a war to secure its borders or repel 
European invaders; the Thai military was united and sufficiently for the Europeans to 
permit this kingdom to remain independent.  As Benedict Anderson noted, “Between 
1840 and 1940 the state ceases not only to engage in warfare but to seriously contemplate 
doing so.”44  Instead, the military in Thailand protected the interests of the central state 
and monarchy against the local power interests. “Like the colonial armies of its 
neighbors, the Thai military was explicitly political, was modernized to protect the 
regime from domestic enemies and enforce its policies, and was not intended for external 
defense.”45  With the reforms by King Chulalongkorn and his successors, some Western 
education and ideas of new forms of governance entered the military ranks, but its roots 
ultimately remained in the centralized state with a religiously legitimated monarch as the 
sovereign.  Duncan McCargo concludes, “The Royal Thai Army, however, is a 
uniformed bureaucracy that does not fight wars…It never waged an independence 
struggle and has never repelled invaders in modern times.”46  This has kept Thailand’s 
military focused on internal duties.   
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C. 1932 COUP AND THE MILITARY IN GOVERNANCE 
Thailand’s military coup of 1932 ended the absolute monarchy by installing a 
constitutional monarchy, but this was not a revolution.  Installing military leaders at the 
top of political institutions neither altered the patrimonial structure of Thai governance 
nor created a rational-legal model of government.  Huntington’s evaluation of Thailand’s 
coups through the 1950s was that this was an example of praetorian regimes where the 
political competition among the military leaders established in politics the interests of the 
middle class.47  The 1932 Coup in Thailand, however, was not akin to the Meiji 
restoration of Japan—in which military force brought in the interests of the business 
class—for the social and political consequences were very different for the military and 
the society.48  Rather than a revolution, the coup enhanced the military’s role within the 
existing patrimonial structure.   
Although the military may have been reform minded, its political nature and 
subsequent elite role in politics prevented any genuine reform.  Also, the military at the 
time represented a society seeking reforms, but not necessarily seeking democracy.  The 
coup leaders may have perceived that rhetoric of democracy was necessary for a modern 
state, but they believed society would still require close paternalistic guidance to be ready 
for this political structure.  The opportunity was available to instill the principles of 
democracy, but the military ultimately stepped in to defend its elite role.  Thus, these 
forms of democratic governance attempted by the various military leaders at this juncture 
lacked real substance.49  The intervention by the military had other consequences on the 
institutions of governance.  The success of the 1932 coup cemented the military’s 
relationship with the bureaucracy, brought the military into politics during a perceived 
crisis, and permitted the military to believe itself a force for democracy.50  The 1932 coup 
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changed the regime of leadership for several decades, but it neither effectively changed 
the structure of state-society relations nor elite governance.   
That the military sought to maintain the elite, patrimonial structure is evident in 
the turnover of governments for the next several decades.  The military leaders who 
competed for political control had similar backgrounds.  The Prime Ministers from 1938 
to 1976 were all born within a 14-year period and were from the same generation that 
staged the first coup in 1932; also, all Prime Ministers until 1991 except one attended one 
of four schools: the military academy, Suan Kulap, Assumption, or the Ministry of 
Justice law school.51  Succession of governments was the result of shifts in political 
power based on personal relationships rather than organized processes like elections.  
Contrary to popular belief, no discernable pattern occurred for succession of governments 
by election or by coup for the several decades following the 1932 coup.  Sources 
commonly refer to 16 coups occurring between 1932 and 1991, but there is not a 
commonly accepted list of these events because no one can claim the single authority to 
define a coup.  The history of Prime Ministers from the government acknowledges at 
most 12 coups d’état.52  The military effectively established a standard format for the 
coup, in which politicians are placed under house arrest, martial law is declared, 
bureaucrats continue to work, and a new government is eventually promulgated.53  With 
repetition of the pattern, the coup became a repertoire in Thailand’s politics.   
No matter how many Constitutions were written with democracy as a pretense, 
democratic forms did not take hold in Thailand.  The next Constitution enacted inevitably 
failed to instill a set of rules for future legitimate governance; it would be written to 
ensure the currently ruling party would remain in power.54  The military leaders’ 
competition for power through coups replaced the palace politics of the past and was 
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legitimated by the monarchy and the support of the civil service.55  The pattern 
continued, and the legitimacy and justification for the military’s reign shifted to suit the 
needs of a political military. 
D. THE REINSTATEMENT AND RISE OF THE MONARCHY’S 
POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
Several factors underlie how the military would remain in power over the several 
decades following the 1932 coup.  Critically important was the restoration of the 
monarchy, which provided a lasting source of legitimacy from the Thai people to military 
rule.  A shifting notion of security to development and anticommunism further justified 
the military’s need for direct involvement in internal politics.  The relationship with the 
monarchy and the concept of national security influenced the military’s sense of 
professionalism and continuing role in governance.  
After the 1957 coup, Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat as Prime Minister returned the 
monarchy the top of Thai governance.  The monarchy was reinstated, celebrated 
throughout the world, and supported the military’s leadership in governance.  The 
relationship was mutually beneficial for Sarit and the monarchy:   
As Thak said, this alliance was a pragmatic secularization of power and 
leadership.  In his sphere, the king was allowed all the sources of 
legitimization he needed.  In return, Sarit as prime minister enjoyed the 
cosmological sanction of the throne, managing the country “on behalf of” 
the throne, and in doing so deriving his own public legitimacy.  This was a 
momentous shift.  As a foundation of its power, the palace traded the 
constitution for partnership with the loyal military.  Royal interests would 
no longer be defended by princes or aristocrats but by common-born army 
generals.56 
The restoration of the monarchy in the 1950s began a long period of an increasing 
role for the king as a national leader in Thai society and governance.  Maintaining the 
historical legitimacy of this form of political structure was important to the government, 
yet challenged by some in Thailand.  Jit Poumisak’s reinterpretation of Thailand’s 
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history, popular among students and communists, was suppressed for equating the 
sakdina system to feudalism.  As Craig Reynolds wrote, “In a state whose legitimacy 
continues to derive from the monarchy and the Buddhist Sangha the sakdina = feudalism 
sign can, under certain circumstances, be deemed a danger.”57  The military leaders 
suppressed Jit’s history because of this perceived threat.  Undermining the meaning of the 
monarchy by linking it to negative impressions of the past, Jit’s history threatened the 
legitimacy of the monarchy’s support to the military leaders, and incidentally supported a 
Marxist view of history that could justify its overthrow.  Thus, Thailand’s government 
recognized the connection of figurative and literal meanings in forms of governance, so 
the same leadership should have been capable of recognizing its own forms to be not as 
democratic as purported.    
Also during the 1950s, the military began espousing a new justification for its 
direct involvement in politics.  The requirements of national security would go further 
than protecting the borders to include development: “In Thailand, as in many developing 
countries, the military have historically considered themselves to be the protectors or 
defenders of national security as well as the developers or modernizers of society.”58  
Improving the national economy required government involvement, and the military was 
the institution best poised to do so.  By integrating national development with national 
security, the military enhanced its role in governance and the power of its bureaucracy.  
With this expanded concept of security, the military further entrenched itself in the 
political structure, which was administered by the military and legitimated by the 
returning monarchy, which was also focused on economic development. 
The 1970s in Thailand would prove to be a turbulent period that instilled some 
lasting, although possibly contradictory, political reforms.  During this period and 
thereafter, legitimacy for a government would require two critical elements: some form 
of representation of the people and the support of the traditional, charismatic king.  The 
king’s interest in securing the state and regime from communism led to his support of 
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Field Marshal Thanom Kittakachorn’s government following the Sarit era from 1968 to 
1973.  Politically aware students rebelled against the abuses of Thanom’s government in 
1973 protests that turned violent.  The disruption of law and order demanded a response 
from the government, but the king tacitly supported the students in order to quell the 
violence.  This support from the king overshadowed whether the military respected the 
students’ demands or feared a loss of legitimacy from repression: “Cooler heads refused 
to send their troops against civilian mobs.”59  The king’s decision to side with the 
students permitted the most liberal form of representative government in Thailand’s 
history to date, which lasted from 1973 to 1976.  This action instilled two enduring 
requirements of Thai governance: parliamentary representation and the king’s support.  
The latter would be necessary sooner.  The openness of political space turned more 
violent as royalist conservatives clashed with liberal reformers in the mid-1970s.  
Ultimately, the king sided with the law and order provided by a military-led conservative 
movement over individual freedoms.60  After the reactionary government lost favor, 
representative forms of governance would be used beginning the in 1980s.  These forms 
would not result from a commitment to democratic principles but, instead, from 
practicality and survival for the military to remain in political power.   
E. THE MILITARY, THE MONARCHY, AND THE APPEARANCE OF 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
Continuing the use of representative forms in the semi-democratic system of 
government during the 1980s was a strategic decision by the military leaders to remain in 
power.  Communism posed a threat to the entire social and political structure of Thailand, 
but the reaction against communism ostracized moderate liberal reformers as “un-Thai” 
for not supporting the monarchy.  The military-led government sought to bring in 
moderates who felt the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was the only option for 
democratic expression.  Opposing communism in Thailand not only kept substantial 
United States’ support flowing, but also helped maintain the elites in power.  In addition: 
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The principal reason why the military opted to relinquish its direct control 
over the body politic pertained to a belated recognition (on the part of the 
military) that a successful government response to the rapidly growing 
CPT insurgency would have to include a meaningful political 
component.61  
Representative forms in government opened the political space for the moderate 
liberal reformers to return to Thai society and politics, but these forms were not the result 
of commitment to democratic principles: “Along with development and suppression 
building democratic institutions became a key pillar of the counterinsurgency strategy…  
Democracy was a policy, a weapon in a war.”62  
The semi-democratic election of General Prem Tinansuland to Prime Minister in 
1980 ushered in a government that, over the next decade, ended the communist threat and 
appeared to be a period of democratic consolidation.  The conservative middle class 
Thais may have preferred the technocrat-capable “demi-democracy.”63  However, 
politically aware Thais least favored this “limited/guided democracy.”64  Despite general 
instability in the political system, Prem’s government maintained a period of regime 
stability for the military-monarchy alliance: “The King trusted Prem absolutely, seeing 
him as an incorruptible figure who shared his soft and understated approach, but who was 
a skilled alliance-builder and wielder of patronage.”65  Despite the instability in the 
political system, Prem’s government maintained a period of regime stability for the 
military-monarchy alliance.  Thailand in the 1980s seemed as though it could transition 
into a more complete democracy, but the illiberal nature of the political leadership meant 
that the quasi-representative forms were not sufficient for a substantive democratic 
transition.   
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F. CORPORATE VALUES OF THAILAND’S MILITARY 
In this view of Thailand’s military up through the 1980s, three key themes emerge 
that are revealing about its identity and its values.  These are intertwined and support one 
another such that a change in one would inherently impact the others.  The first theme is 
that Thailand’s military began as a political army and continues to operate as one despite 
democratic reforms.  Thailand’s modern military finds its beginnings in Siam in the 
eighteenth century and the consolidation of the present-day kingdom around the 
monarchy.  Despite the appearance of a modern, bureaucratic structure, the social or 
political elite status necessary for entry into the officer corps installed a political nature in 
the force from its birth.  The 1932 coup ended the absolute monarchy and installed the 
military as the new political elite.  For the next several decades, Thailand’s military 
sustained its authority through continuous involvement in governance.  The repertoire of 
the coup became the means of determining new political leadership, and constitutions 
attempted to ensure political power for the leading group.  Gradually, individuals of 
various backgrounds were able to rise through the ranks, but the military leadership 
remained a central element of the political elite.  Shifts toward what appeared to be 
democracy were elite strategies, notably to quell student unrest and combat communism.  
The role of the military in governance instilled an identity as the guarantor of social order 
and privilege.   
Secondly, the military supports a traditional monarchy as a primary source of its 
own political legitimacy.  Although the coup of 1932 ended the reign of the last absolute 
monarch, the palace coup did not revolutionize the political structure.  During the 1940s 
to 1950s, with little influence from the monarchy, the military continued to use the 
centralized structure and patrimonial character of the state with military leaders as the 
elite in the place of the monarchy.  To bolster its position within this structure, the 
military brought the monarchy back in a mutually beneficial relationship that continues to 
support the centralized state.  This arrangement is further supported by the religious 
structure of Thailand, which asserts that the king possesses the necessary dharma to be 
the nation’s leader.  The monarch as father of the nation is a necessary figure in Thai 
society; it is he who must show the nation what is right, provide discipline, and serve as a 
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role model and final arbiter.  The military and the monarchy sustained this political 
partnership through the actions of the military, the monarchy, and the Privy Council.  The 
popular support for the monarchy gives legitimacy to whomever or to whichever 
organization the monarchy supports as the political leader of the nation.  The military 
supports this monarchy, which in turn promotes the military as necessary for order.   
Thirdly, the notion of security in Thailand goes beyond defending the nation’s 
borders.  Once Thailand’s neighbors were colonized and Siam was no longer under the 
same threat, the threats to the Thai state were predominantly internal rather than external.  
Steven David explains this as omnibalancing, which considers the balance of power for 
internal threats as much as external threats to the state and regime.66  The security role for 
Thailand’s military was in consolidating control over the periphery and defining and 
promoting national interests, which are inherently political.  National security expanded 
to include development in the 1950s and incorporated political and economic reform to 
counter communism in the 1980s.  Yet, maintaining the traditional political order also 
became a concern of national security.  Under civilian political leadership in the early 
1970s, violent clashes in society raised questions about the civilian government’s ability 
to maintain law and order.  Although (or perhaps because) this violence was spurred on 
by deposed military leaders, the military was perceived and perceived itself as necessary 
to restore order.  Defending the political order ensures the monarchy’s willingness and 
ability to support the military’s role in governance.     
The three values are interrelated in a way that redefines the notions of 
professionalism beyond the Huntington’s objective control model.  Thailand’s military 
perceives that it must defend the political structure from internal and external threats.  
Threats to the hybrid structure of Thai politics compromise the military’s ability to 
defend the state, nation, and monarchy.  Political power is necessary for the military to 
defend the state and guarantee social order.  The structure of the social and political 
system bestows the responsibility for order to the leaders of the nation, and the military 
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and monarchy alliance holds itself in that role of responsibility.  Collectively, these three 
values of Thailand’s military shape its interests and, thus, the actions it takes.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Reviewing the involvement of Thailand’s military in governance through two 
periods of apparent democratic consolidation in the 1930s to 1940s and the 1970s reveals 
a history of a political army whose values are traditional and patrimonial in nature.  
Thailand was founded on a royalist elite political structure with a military that supported 
it.  The political structure, and social order, found its legitimacy in traditional, patron-
client relationships.  The European style of a modern, bureaucratic state was imposed by 
the monarchy on top of this traditional legitimacy.  The military’s intervention in 1932 
failed to disrupt this structure and, instead, imbedded the military’s leadership within it.  
The traditional paternalism that created Thailand retained more political currency than 
the rational-legal systems of legitimacy.  The “birthright principle” and Thai concept of 
military professionalism permits political activity and helps explain the military’s 
continued participation in politics.  From this sustained participation in governance, a set 
of values for the military emerged.  These values include a concept of national security of 
defending not only borders, but also the traditional monarchy as the primary source of 
political legitimacy and the necessity of political power over social order and 
development for military effectiveness.  The values and their interrelationship shape the 
military’s interests and help explain its actions in governance in Thailand, both 
historically and today.   
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III. 1991 COUP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The characterization of the 1991 coup in Thailand as an anachronistic attempt by 
the military to reestablish its prominence in Thailand’s politics only describes part of the 
scene.  The coup resulted from a simultaneous occurrence of civilian failures and military 
strengths.  The balance of the political forces that supported the semi-democracy of the 
1980s fell apart when Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhawan’s elected civilian 
government took office in 1989.  A perception of civilian incompetence and political 
stalemate put his government in a weak political position.  At the same time, the military 
remained strong within the state and retained its political mindset.  The source of power 
for the new, elected government and its exercising of its authority challenged the 
military’s values and role within the government.  When this government threatened the 
military’s interests in cabinet positions and appointments, in particular, the military 
stepped in with the initial consent of the middle class and the monarchy. 
The events that led up to the 1991 coup contain a combination of factors that 
cause coups as described by Karsten and Koonings and Krujit.  Koonings and Krujit’s 
three principles of birthright, civilian incompetence, and military competence each are 
demonstrated.67  Karsten’s factors of political stalemate, affronts to military values, and 
direct threats to military interests were each part of the military’s decision to step in.68  
The combination of these factors was necessary before the coup could occur; it appears 
that no single factor was able to precipitate the coup on its own.  The complexity of the 
events begins with the administration preceding Chatichai’s elected government coming 
into office. 
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B. GENERAL PREM’S SEMI-DEMOCRACY: PRELUDE 
In the wake of the reactionary military rule following the 1973–76 period of 
liberal democracy, the political elites in Thailand reached a balance of power.  The 1978 
Constitution created a semi-democratic system.  The parliament consisted of an elected 
lower house and a senate that mostly had been appointed by the king and contained a 
large number of military leaders.  General Prem Tinansulanond came into office with 
military support within the senate in his favor.  The former general was not an elected 
official, but he staffed his cabinet with members of the major parties to ensure majority 
support within the elected house.69  The middle class accepted Prem for his integrity, and 
in the belief that he could limit corruption from the top.70  The semi-democratic system 
succeeded with its selection of a leader who was acceptable to variety of groups and who 
could balance the prevailing political forces. 
Despite the limitations on democratic participation, Thailand in the 1980s 
experienced some political liberalization.  With the steady, strong growth of the 
economy, civil society and business interests and their influence in politics also grew.  In 
the final years of the 1980s, Thailand became Asia’s “Fifth Tiger” with double-digit 
growth in gross domestic product and a 50 percent increase in per capita income.71  
Various groups of civil society became involved in the political process and influenced 
the very constitution of the government and the state.72  The liberalization of politics 
appeared promising by the end of the decade, but some of the fundamental qualities of 
democracy were still absent.  Professor Chai-Anan Samutwanit wrote that, by 1990, the 
structure of politics in Thailand was a balance of bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic 
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forces, each seeking to maximize its power.73  This system was unlikely to produce a 
pluralist democracy, and a coup was still considered an acceptable means of transferring 
power.74  The political position of civil society and business interests grew stronger 
against the state through the economic growth and political stability of the decade.   
While civil society and business involvement were growing, the military retained 
its strong position in Thai society.  General Prem, even after officially leaving the 
military, was able to keep the support of the army leaders through strong leadership, 
patronage, and ties to the palace.  The military was involved throughout the nation in its 
anticommunist campaign, but its leadership in Bangkok was fractured over the future of 
the nation and the military.  The counterinsurgency campaign against the Communist 
Party of Thailand (CPT) promulgated democratic forms and other persuasive tactics as a 
means of diverting the liberally minded Thai away from the CPT, and the campaign 
succeed by 1986.  During the 1980s, however, several factions of military officers had 
become politically active and, on two occasions, one faction attempted to unseat Prem 
from office by coups.  Prem was able to remain in office by retaining the favor of the 
monarchy and by the actions of loyal senior officers.  Under Prem’s leadership, the 
military as a whole was in a strong position throughout Thailand, but fractures in its 
leadership kept the military politically limited. 
The 1980s in Thailand under the Prem administration saw relative stability, but 
the balance was precarious.  Sukhumbhand Paribatra explains that the 1978 Constitution 
lasted for 12 years for three reasons: divisiveness within the armed forces, the ability of 
individual political leaders, and the strong legitimizing force of the monarchy.75  Prem’s 
strength over each of these factors kept the government stable.  After Prem stepped down 
in 1988, Chatichai’s elected administration would soon upset the balance. 
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C. CHATICHAI’S GOVERNMENT: THE CIVILIAN FACTORS 
In 1988, Chatichai’s entrance into government appeared to be a successful 
consolidation of democratic forms.  With a shift in political support in Parliament, the 
unelected Prem stepped down to permit the elected Chatichai into the office of Prime 
Minister.  The politicians in Parliament had greatly benefited from growth in civil society 
and the business community.76  Through established networks of vote collectors, business 
interests were able to gather votes in rural areas that sought immediate returns for their 
representation in Parliament.77  Chatichai was not accepted in the same manner as Prem 
by the urban middle class, which raised questions about the integrity of the new 
politicians with their business interests.  Accusations of corruption and vote buying came 
nearly immediately after Chatichai took office.78  The corruption accusations challenged 
the legitimacy of the leaders elected by the democratic forms, but this represented more 
the frustration with the person selected by the process than the faults of the process itself.  
The change in the source of power for the government (from bureaucratic to elected), the 
capabilities of the new government, and the actions taken to retain power all served to 
upset the balance of power that had supported Prem’s administration.   
1. Civilian Incompetence and Political Stalemate 
Political stalemate grew in part out of the incompetence of the democratically 
elected government.  Karsten links the factor of political stalemate with Koonings and 
Krujit’s civilian incompetence principle by providing examples of physical attacks on 
opposition parties’ members and continuous reforming of governments, both of which 
indicate the inability to compromise and permit a loyal opposition to operate.79  The 
elected government demonstrated incompetence through failed government programs and 
its inability to retain political support.  Political stalemate resulted from the erosion of 
political support coupled with efforts to maintain control in office. 
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Chatichai, a former general, entered office under the political strength of the 
parties in 1988, but his administration was unable to retain that strong position.  Several 
failures of government plans led Thais to believe the new government was less capable 
than Prem’s had been.  The king’s speech in 1990 referred to several infrastructure 
projects that would have benefited from a more flexible government.80  A good number 
of parliamentarians were “poorly educated rural politicians who were able to deliver 
votes but were perceived by the middle class voters as entering politics solely to make 
money through kickbacks.”81  The mindset of the politicians affected the democratic 
process as well.  The political parties failed to institutionalize as actual representatives of 
the people, and the politicians “failed to assume the responsibilities of governance in a 
constructive, clean and efficient manner.”82  The incompetence of the elected officials led 
to political stalemate. 
The political stalemate of Chatichai’s government was in large part a failure to 
maintain the support of the electorate and the monarchy.  The political stalemate in this 
case is the “conflicting expectations of elections, politicians, and democratic government 
itself of two major social forces—the urban, educated middle class and the rural farmers 
or peasants.”83  This failure resulted from the competition for understanding democracy’s 
operating principles for Thailand by those promoting the use of its forms.  The middle 
class challenged cabinet members on accusations of corruption; the military challenged 
cabinet members for their offenses against the military.  The military called on the Prime 
Minister to remove a cabinet member, Foreign Policy advisor Sukhombhand Partibatra, 
after his statements that the military academy’s curriculum should be revised, which 
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implied the military should be less political.84  To ward off a coup, Chatichai named 
General Chaovalit as defense minister, for which he stepped down as army commander.85   
Eventually, the monarchy lost confidence in the elected government, as reflected 
in the king’s remarks that democracy does not always produce the best results.86  The 
king’s birthday speech of 1990 marked a departure of support for the Chatichai’s 
administration.87  In an attempt to retain office, Chatichai reshuffled his cabinet again.  In 
December 1990, the third cabinet within four months included a shift in the coalition of 
ruling parties, but it also marked a weakening of support for Chatichai in Parliament.88  
The reshuffles also included an attempt to revive the career for one of the military’s rivals 
as a check on its political power.89  Chaticahi could not remain in power without the 
support of the politicians who opposed the leaders in the military.90  The continuous 
reshuffling of the cabinet reflected the attempt by Chatichai’s administration to maintain 
power when neither the middle class nor the military felt represented in the cabinet.  The 
contending sources of political power were unable to reach a compromise, and the 
political stalemate debilitated the government to the point that the monarchy removed its 
support. 
The political support for Chatichai was capable of bringing the elected officials 
into power but was not able to keep them there.  The business interests that characterized 
the elected government came in conflict with the democratic principles of the middle 
class and the traditional interests of the military and monarchy.  While able to gather 
votes for elections, the politicians were not competent in office to demonstrate they 
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should be there.  The resulting political stalemate weakened the position of the civilian 
government against the increasing political strength of the military.  This shift in political 
power created the opportunity for the military to step in. 
D. THE MILITARY’S MINDSET 
While the elected government was losing legitimacy among the educated middle 
class, the military also posed a strong political challenge.  The military’s actions against 
the Chatichai government represent the factors of Kooning and Krujit’s military 
competence and Karsten’s affronts to military values.  The military’s competence and 
perceived ability to lead resulted from the strongest unity in leadership within the force 
since 1976 and from the position of the state in society, resulting from the anticommunist 
campaign providing the rhetoric of defending democracy and nation.  The affronts to the 
military’s values by the Chatichai government included the changing role of the military 
within the government and the perceived challenges to the military’s leaders from the 
politicians.  The relative political strength of the military against the elected government 
helped create the military’s desire to step in. 
1. Military Competence: Unity and Ability 
The competence and strength of Thailand’s military was enhanced by its 
effectiveness against the CPT.  The counterinsurgency campaign from the military-led 
government of the 1980s put the military in a position of defending national security by 
promoting its limited version of democracy.  Despite some factionalism since the 
authoritarian governments of the early and late 1970s, the Thai officers had the common 
beliefs that communism posed the greatest threat to the institutions that are essential for 
national security—nation, religion, and monarchy—and that political intervention was an 
acceptable means to suppress these threats.91  During the 1980s, prime minister’s orders 
No. 66/2523 and No. 66/2525 made evident the Army’s strategy to control the rural 
population rather than suppressing them: “The former was known as the policy to defeat 
the Communist Party of Thailand, which state that to destroy the CPT it was necessary to 
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establish a truly democratic regime.”92  The military controlled the semi-democratic 
process, ensuring it was conservative and representative but not truly participatory; and 
the military officials remained in office until the late 1980s.93  Although electoral reforms 
permitted more liberal involvement in politics, they did not result in genuine democratic 
reforms.94  The military’s efforts extended the project Connors labels 
“democrasubjection,” in which the elites in Thailand gave the impression of democracy 
while actually controlling its outcomes.95  With the state’s control of the electoral 
outcomes, “these bureaucracies also had a propensity to see politicians and voluntary 
political participation as potential threats, not only to their roles and functions but also to 
the nations ‘true’ interests.”96  Although the state’s direct role in politics undermined the 
genuine nature of the democracy, the political process in Thailand was increasingly 
liberal in comparison to the regimes of the 1960s and 1970s.  The military benefited from 
the perception of opening political space while maintaining competent rule.  Further, its 
control over the spread of democratic forms gave the military the use of rhetoric about 
defending democracy.97 
The unity of the military reached a high point when Class Five ascended to the 
top posts in the Army in 1989.98  The unity of leadership was a departure from the 
factionalism of the 1980s: “This meant that, for the first time since 1973, the military and 
especially the Army, while not free of factionalism, was effectively under the control of 
one group.”99  Class Five had been challenged by the Thai Young Turks, who 
represented a younger generation of officers, led by Class Seven, seeking a more 
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professional, less politicized military force.  The factionalism had resulted from different 
interpretations of what were the threats to national security, but the ideal of defending the 
national institutions never wavered.  The coup attempts of 1981 and 1985 were consistent 
with the impression that military intervention was an acceptable means of defending the 
nation’s interests by seizing the authority to define the threats.  Each coup attempt stood 
down when Prem demonstrated he retained the support of the monarchy.100  The result of 
the coup attempts was the removal of involved officers from Class Seven.  To solidify his 
relationship with the military leadership in 1989, Chatichai permitted the military, under 
General Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, to select its own promotions; and Chaovalit promoted 
members of Class Five, “the largest, most cohesive class in the higher reaches of the 
military.”101  When Chaovalit stepped down to take political office, Class Five was left 
without rival in the military.102  The military, which had a strong sense of protection of 
national interests, was left without an internal rival in interpreting what really posed the 
threats to the nation.   
By 1988, Thailand’s military held a strong position in Thai society due to the 
success against the CPT, its effective rule, liberalizing political space, and the 
monarchy’s continued support of its leaders.  With no factional divisions remaining, unity 
within the military was at a high point.  The attitude of the leadership may then determine 
how the military would respond to the elected government, its processes, and its actions. 
2. Affronts to Military Values: The Leaders and Their Role in 
Government 
The leadership that ascended to the top Army positions during Chaitichai’s 
administration had represented a particular disposition toward politicians.  Military 
leaders had an expectation they could participate, if not lead, in government.  General 
Chaovalit, as army commander, planned to eventually become Prime Minister but had to 
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change tack in response to the unexpected, initial stability of Chatichai’s government.103  
Meanwhile, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, while deputy army commander, made clear 
his feelings toward elected officials: “Suchinda said he would not submit to politicians 
‘because I have dignity.’…I do not bow to politicians…If I were the army commander-
in-chief, there must be no conditions attached. The power must be in my hands.”104  
These traditional views of the military in government extended to most of the other 
members of Class Five, whose class president was Suchinda.  Hewison explains: 
Class 5 developed a cohesiveness necessary to counter the Young Turks, 
who they felt had been disrespectful towards senior officers (Suchit 1987; 
FEER 1 August 1991).  By extension, this perceived impertinence 
suggested that the Young Turks had stepped outside the old structures of 
authority and political activity, while Class 5 craved a return to more 
traditional values.  This group…reflected the traditional military view that 
a government relying on parliamentary support was inherently unstable.  
Consequently, such governments were seen as a threat to national security 
(Chai-Anan 1990: 185).105 
The military leadership, which came into its top positions by 1990, unified and 
unchallenged, already held a particular contempt for the uncertainty of democratic 
processes and the politicians it contained.   
Chatichai’s entering office was not only at odds with the attitudes of the 
traditional military leaders, but also represented a change in the source of power within 
the electoral political system.  Fewer positions reserved for officers threatened the 
military’s position within the democratic process that it had previously controlled.  “For 
these conservatives, the Chatichai government, the parliamentary form, and the logic of 
its operations represented the essence of the capitalist revolution and embodied the spirit 
of change in society, and promised political participation which was wider than the 
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technocratic authoritarianism they preferred.”106  Even more so, with a change in the 
source of electoral power came a shift in the committees of power within the government.  
Chai-Anan notes: 
Instead of relying on and consulting with the NESDB [National Economic 
and Social Development Board] and the JPPCC [Joint Public-Private 
Consultative Committee], as Prem had always done when making major 
economic policy decisions, Chaitichai preferred to establish direct links 
with individual members of the business community and to keep decision-
making closer to his cabinet of elected politicians.”107 
The promotion of an elected civilian politician to Prime Minister meant a change 
within the electoral source of power and a change in the groups that influenced the Prime 
Minister’s decisions, including who sat in the cabinet and led key agencies.  Both 
developments threatened the traditional role of the bureaucracy and the military within 
the government.   
The roles of the military and the bureaucracy within the government and its 
decisions were seriously compromised during Chatichai’s administration.  Up to that 
point, the military and bureaucracy had controlled the political outcomes and were 
unified in the ability to determine what was best for the nation.  This mindset was 
pervasive in the military of the 1980s, but no longer was the bureaucracy the primary 
source of power for the officials.  Further, the leadership of the military had a particular 
contempt for the politicians.  Suchinda and Class Five rose to the top of their field by 
countering attempts to disrupt the traditional system.  Contempt for the politicians also 
existed among the middle-class supporters of democratic ideals, who were frustrated by 
the politicians’ blatantly corrupt practices.  A particular threat to the military would soon 
occur that would represent the threats to these values and signify the weakening political 
position of Chatichai’s government.  The military could then justify stepping in.   
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E. IMMEDIATE CAUSES: DIRECT THREATS TO MILITARY INTERESTS 
By 1991, the conditions were set that established the elected government and the 
military as opposing political forces.  Chatichai’s government represented capitalist 
business interests, and the corrupt practices for those interests weakened the 
government’s political position and contributed to a loss of legitimacy from the middle 
class that supported democratic ideals.  Suchinda’s military represented the traditional 
values, sought to continue the strength of the Thai state, which had promoted semi-
democracy for the previous decade, and was the most unified in leadership since the 
reactionary authoritarianism of the late 1970s.  A threat by the government to the 
immediate interests of the military could now precipitate military intervention.  Conflict 
occurred over Chatichai’s nominations for defense leaders, who were unacceptable to 
Suchinda.  The attempted appointments embodied the political struggle between the 
government and the military for their immediate and long-term consequences, which thus 
compelled the military to step in.   
Before the coup, Chatichai and his cabinet had publicly clashed with the military 
several times about the appointment of cabinet members.  On two occasions, clashes over 
the cabinet nearly resulted in the military staging a coup.  The resignation of 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra and naming of Chaovalit as defense minister resulted from a 
rally of thousands of military officers in Bangkok.108  When Chaovalit as defense 
minister was accused in Parliament of corruption, Suchinda called a meeting with Prem, 
and by extension the monarchy, and Chatichai.  The monarchy’s support remained with 
Chatichai, but Chaovalit was left out of the cabinet reshuffle.109  In November of 1990, 
Suchinda made another unsuccessful move against Chatichai to demand the removal of 
another cabinet member, Chalem Yubamrung; Chatichai retained the minister as an 
apparent stand against military interference.110  Despite Suchinda’s taking over capitol 
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security, a meeting of the two directly with the king left Chatichai in office once again.111  
As long as the elected government retained the support of the monarchy, the military 
remained limited in its political influence over the cabinet.  Cabinet positions, however, 
were clearly valued by the military leaders, and Chatichai continually battled with 
military over these appointments. 
By the end of 1990, the king’s favor shifted away from the elected government.  
The king’s review of the military and his birthday speech indicated more support for the 
military and “traditional Thai forms” with less support for the government and “Western” 
methods.112  Chatichai, his cabinet again, and his appointments directly assaulted the 
military’s political sensitivities and, this time, the monarchy as well.  Chatichai revived 
the career of Major General Manoon Roopkachorn, a rival of Class Five in disgrace for 
his involvement in the 1981 and 1985 coup attempts.113  The army leaders renewed an 
accusation that implicated Manoon in an assassination plot against Prem and the 
Queen.114  Chatichai attempted to appoint General Arthit Kamplangek to work with 
Charlem on proving the accusations against Manoon were groundless.115  Arthit was 
previously supported by Class Five and was key in suppressing the failed coup attempts, 
but he had also restored Manoon after the first attempt.116  In the contested issue of 
appointments and cabinet positions, Chatichai moved to install someone senior to the 
army leaders.  Suchinda took action before the appointment could take place by arresting 
Chatichai and Arthit before their flight to visit the king departed.117  The resulting coup 
received an almost popular welcome as the middle class and monarchy had removed their 
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support for the elected government.118  The tradition-minded coup leaders continued the 
historic pattern.  As with previous coups in their bloodless form, the National 
Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) nullified the constitution, named an interim government, 
and continued the operations of the state.   
F. ANALYSIS 
1. Factors Present for the 1991 Coup 
More than this single incident of the attempted appointment of a rival-faction 
former general was necessary to precipitate a coup.  A combination of factors, as 
suggested by Karsten, Koonings, and Krujit existed within the political events of 
Thailand in 1991.  Two of the suggested factors, however, either were not present or were 
not actually indicative of a coup.  Recognizing the combination present for the 1991 coup 
but absent from the preceding twelve years contributes to the understanding of the 
necessary factors for future coups.   
Kooning and Krujit provide three principle conditions for military intervention: 
the birthright principle, civilian incompetence, and military competence.  Each of these 
was a necessary, but not singularly sufficient, condition for the 1991 coup.  The birthright 
principle informed the perception by the bureaucracy and the military of their central role 
in Thai society and even in spreading a conservative form of democracy.  Further, the 
particular mindset of the military leadership in 1991 espoused traditional values for the 
government.  The elected government proved its incompetence as technocrats through the 
failure of government plans, unlike the previous administrations led by General Prem.  
The king cited these failures in his speech that removed his political support for 
Chatichai’s government.  Finally, the military appeared to be a competent organization in 
comparison.  Having recently succeeded against the CPT, the counterinsurgency 
campaign heavily laden with its persuasive tactics opened political space under the  
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military’s rule.  The military appeared capable as the defenders of national interests and 
supporters of democratic processes.  Each of these principles for military intervention 
was present at the time of the coup. 
Several of Karsten’s factors were also present leading into the coup: political 
stalemate, affronts to military values, and direct threats to military interests.  Political 
stalemate of the elected government resulted from the loss of democratic support.  The 
goals of democracy conflicted between the middle class seeking liberal ideals and 
technical competence and the lower class seeking regional benefits from the national 
government.119  As Chatichai’s administration lost the support of the military and the 
monarchy, the political stalemate was demonstrated by the consistent reshuffling of the 
cabinet to retain power.  The interests represented in the cabinet and the practices of the 
elected administration left the bureaucracy and military less involved in the policy-
making process, where they previously had been prominent.  Thailand’s military, which 
considered a strong state necessary for the greater institutions of nation, religion, and 
monarchy, took offense to their weakened position within the government.  Although the 
military leaders already had the mindset that the military should lead the nation 
politically, the coup did not occur until the civilian government was politically weak and 
attempted to assert control directly over the military’s interests.  During the 1980s, 
Prem’s administration maintained its political strength over the military leaders who 
twice attempted to depose him.  When the last cabinet reshuffle of Chatichai’s weakened 
administration attempted to check the military’s political position, the direct threat to the 
military’s interests pushed the situation over the edge.  All of these factors together were 
necessary to inspire Thailand’s military to take action. 
2. Factors Not Present for the 1991 Coup 
Two other factors from Karsten—economic distress and corruption—were not 
relevant for the 1991 coup in Thailand.  Economic distress was certainly not 
characteristic of Thailand through the 1980s, and corruption later proved not to be a 
genuine cause for the coup.  The 1980s, and much of the 1990s, proved to be a period of 
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consistently strong economic growth in Thailand.  Economic growth facilitated the 
liberalization of politics with the growth of civil society and eventually the business 
interests.  Economic strength supported the corrupt practices that compromised the 
democratic forms of the elected government.   
Corruption was the reason cited as driving the coup by the National Peacekeeping 
Council and the reason accepted by the middle class who welcomed the intervention.  
However, corruption in politics existed before and after the Chatichai administration.  
The middle class acknowledged that Prem’s government also had corruption, but Prem 
had the integrity to hold corruption within limits.120  The middle class did not have the 
same perception of integrity for Chatichai, so corruption became a focal point.  The 
events of 1992 proved that the military’s interest to retain power outweighed its position 
against corruption.  For example, in an effort to retain a government coalition, the 
Suchinda-led administration incorporated some of the same corrupt officials whom the 
military investigated immediately following the coup.121  The interim Prime Minister 
Anand Punyarachun even acknowledged that corruption was still a part of life in 
Thailand, although widely abhorred; corruption was merely an excuse used to justify the 
military’s coup, which worked due to the disaffection with corrupted electoral politics.122  
Corruption certainly existed in Thailand’s politics leading into the coup, and provided the 
excuse for staging the coup.  Corruption provided the excuse to complain about the 
undesirable outcome of the elected government, a Prime Minister considered lacking in 
integrity.  Corruption’s role in politics before, during, and after Chatichai’s government 
indicates that corruption itself was not an actual factor for the military’s intervention. 
3. Counterfactuals 
Several factors came together in Thailand’s politics to precipitate a coup at this 
point in time.  The combination of these factors was necessary, and the absence of one 
could have avoided the coup.  Outcomes other than a coup were possible under suggested 
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alternative conditions for the political competence of the elected government, the role of 
the bureaucracy and military within the new government, and the unity and political 
strength of the military at the time of the coup.   
Chatichai’s elected government suffered political stalemate resulting from the 
middle class’ rejection of his officials as incompetent and corrupt.  The practices and 
interests of the elected officials offended the middle class, who sought real democracy 
and the military leaders who had traditional values.  The withdrawal of support by these 
groups culminated in the king’s speech, which indicated the monarchy’s removal of 
support.  The poor public perception of the government left the monarchy unable to 
defend the elected leaders.  The king’s birthday speech just prior to the coup indicated a 
lack of support for a democratic system that could not produce results for the people.  As 
the voice for the nation, and as the revered head of the state, the king’s withdrawal of 
support for the elected government indicated the withdrawal of the nation’s support.  The 
loss of support opened the opportunity for the military.  Not until the king expressed 
dissatisfaction with the elected government’s incompetence did the military succeed in 
stepping in.  In essence, incompetence and low public opinion alone were not enough. 
The military and the bureaucracy had been accustomed to having a role in policy 
formation until Chatichai’s administration.  Chatichai preferred using direct contacts with 
elected politicians and business leaders rather than the bureaucratic committees that had 
previously made national policy decisions.  Thus, confrontation occurred over cabinet 
positions and appointments that could influence the policy decisions.  Repeatedly 
Chatichai was under pressure from the military over this.  If Chatichai had been willing to 
include the military and the bureaucracy in the policy decision process, the military 
leaders would not have had the same foundation for considering the power of the state 
was eroding in favor of corrupt business interests.  To the military, the strength of the 
state was a vital national interest.  If the Chatichai administration could have co-opted the 
military’s interests in retaining the power of the state, the confrontation over cabinet 
positions would have less meaning to the military leaders.   
The loss of Chaovalit from the cabinet proved to be the last check on the Class 
Five leadership.  Nominating Arthit challenged the military’s political position by 
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attempting to revive the career of the Class Seven leader, Manoon.  Without the inter-
clique rivalry left within the service, the claim by the military over the nation’s interests 
was left unchallenged by others in the military’s leadership.  Any of the military’s 
factions accepted that a coup could be necessary to defend the nation’s institutions, but 
the success of a coup was less likely when opposed within the military.  The Class Five 
leadership included the officers who stopped the Class Seven coup attempts of the 1980s, 
and they were promoted as a highly unified leadership without an internal rival.  If the 
Chatichai government had not lost the check on the military in the first place or had 
successfully maintained factional rivalry within the service, then Chatichai may have 
found support within the ranks against the leading group.  Without a factional rivalry, 
Chatichai sought to regain political control over the military leaders through an 
appointment.  The clear attempt to impose a political check on the military, by a 
nomination that furthered the appearance of corruption, was the tipping point for the 
coup. 
Several alternative paths were possible for the Chatichai administration.  
Resolving the perception of corruption by the middle class could have prevented the loss 
of legitimacy and the removal of support by the king.  Moderating the actual political 
position of the elected offices within the state and thus maintaining a role for the 
bureaucracy and military within the government would have made civilian control over 
the government by the elected officials less threatening to the military leaders.  
Preventing any single group from having complete politically unified control over the 
military would have maintained the fractures within the service, which prevented earlier 
coups.   
G. CONCLUSION 
For a variety of reasons, the elected government in Thailand in 1991 was unable 
to hold on to political power.  The technocratic incompetence and political stalemate by 
the elected government eroded the support of the middle class and the monarchy.  The 
opportunity opened for the military to be in a stronger political position.  The competence 
of the military resulted from its counterinsurgency success in spreading democratic forms 
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and the unity of a single faction leading the services.  The key to the 1991 coup was that 
the particular leaders also represented a traditional set of values that supported a strong 
state position in society and a political army that is entitled to and best capable of leading 
the nation.  This mindset of military leaders included an underlying value that existed in 
the various factions of the 1980s, but one faction was left unchecked and in an 
advantageous position by 1991.  The politically weakened elected government challenged 
the military’s values by removing its role in policy making and the immediate interests of 
the military by attempting to check its unity and political position.  The combination of 
these factors in Thailand in 1991 permitted and compelled the military to step in against 
the elected government.  
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IV. 2006 COUP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Thailand’s coup of 2006 had a different character from the previous coup, but 
many of the same conditions existed.  Civilian incompetence led to political stalemate.  
The stalemate opened the opportunity for the military to take action.  The military had 
appeared to become less political yet maintained a strong, competent position in 
Thailand’s society.  Leading up to the coup, the military experienced a resurgence of 
royalist support within the leadership, and the expanding influence of Thaksin challenged 
the values of this faction.  The elected government’s challenge to the military’s interests 
again took the form of influencing the promotion process.  Thaksin’s influence on the 
military reshuffle would have shored up his control over politics, so the military again 
took action under the guise of defending democracy.   
B. 1990s AND THE ELECTION OF THAKSIN SHINAWATRA 
Politics in Thailand through the 1990s reflected a shift in political authority away 
from traditional bureaucratic and military elites toward democratic forms including more 
of a role from civil society and business.  The attempt by the military to retain power 
after the 1991 coup led to a middle-class uprising during May 1992 in a clear rejection of 
the military leadership.  By calling the competing factional leaders—the newly elected 
Prime Minister, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, and Chamlong Srimuang, the former 
governor of Bangkok and leader of an opposition party—to prostrate before him, the 
monarchy rose in stature and brought about a political compromise.  The new 
government returned to the semi-democratic form of elected and appointed leaders, 
which entrenched the positions of the network monarchy led by the head of the Privy 
Council, General Prem Tinandsuland.  Network monarchy refers to the network-based 
politics and intervention into the political system by the monarchy, usually through a 
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proxy like Prem, with the interest of ensuring the “right person” is in place.123  The 
gradual trend toward more democracy would continue throughout the decade.  The 
financial crisis of 1997 permitted the biggest step toward democracy with the passing of 
the more participatory and competitive “People’s Constitution.”  Through the 1990s, 
Thailand’s military had a shrinking role in politics, and the forms of democracy were on 
the rise.   
The rules of politics changed with the 1997 Constitution, which was to serve as a 
significant boost for democratic consolidation.  A confluence of internal and external 
interests in developing democracy brought about the passage of the new constitution; and 
the divergence of those interests eventually led to the failure of genuine consolidation.124  
Democracy in Thailand could still be considered the project of elites to legitimate their 
control over the strong state institutions.  The new form of this project in the 1990s was 
the national myth of a democratic state that is responsive to a participant, plural citizenry 
who are mediated by the traditional institutions.125  The capitalist class was less 
constrained now, however, and used its power to dominate the recomposing of the state 
to promote its own interests.126  While democratic forms were increasingly important to 
the legitimacy of the government, the politicians who took power undermined the 
principles of democracy and the institutions intended to protect it.  Before the politicians 
could undermine the new democratic system, a coup later in the 1990s was unlikely for 
several reasons: the military was reluctant to take a direct role in politics in the wake of 
the events of 1992, the convergence of traditional elite political forces supported the 
                                                 
123  McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises .”  “Right person” typically refers to 
someone with technocratic competency, loyalty to the monarchy, and public integrity. 
124  Amy Freedman, “Thailand’s Missed Opportunity for Democratic Consolidation,” Japanese 
Journal of Political Science 7, no. 2 (2006), 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=449627&jid=JJP&volumeId=7&issueId=
02&aid=449626 (accessed February 8, 2011).   
125 Michael Kelly Connors, “Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change,” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no. 4 (2003): 434–6, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=475084221&Fmt=7&clientId=119
69&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed February 8, 2011). 
126  Ibid. 
 51
democracy movement and the national institutions that the military valued, and the 
military’s interests were supported by the political forces in power.   
In 2001, the billionaire businessman-turned-politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, 
entered the office of Prime Minister with capitalist class interests and changed the 
political dynamics of Thailand.  Thaksin represented a departure from the state-
dominated government that appeared slow and incompetent during the 1997 financial 
crisis.  Big business and politics under Thaksin were Siamese twins, joined at the hip.127  
Thaksin entered office with overwhelming support of the population to make government 
more responsive and the support of the monarchy.  His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party 
combined populist policies with big business interests to gain overwhelming electoral 
support.  The corrupt practices of earlier periods in Thailand’s politics had not changed, 
and vote-buying and patronage networks were significant in gaining the electoral support 
from the rural regions.  The majority support that brought the TRT into power also 
legitimated Thaksin’s goals and his role as the nation’s leader.  Thaksin’s interest in 
power became clear during his term in office, and his practices in office eventually 
eroded his support and challenged the traditional elites.   
The 1990s and early 2000s in Thailand witnessed an increase in democratic forms 
and legitimacy derived from them.  However, the popular election of a leader over a state 
structure that remained powerful in society did not guarantee the principles that make for 
genuine democracy.  Thaksin’s abuse of power and his control of the strong implements 
of the state eventually eroded support from the middle class and challenged the values of 
the traditional elites.  The network monarchy that had controlled the state before Thaksin 
looked to a traditional source of support—the military—to regain its position. 
C. THAILAND’S MILITARY BY 2006 
Following the aftermath of the 1991 Coup, “the Thai military entered the post 
1992 era thoroughly discredited in the political arena.”128  After the events of 1992, the 
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days of the military directly administering the government appeared to be over.  
However, the military remained a competent institution in its core areas of defense policy 
and foreign affairs.  Thailand’s military made shifts toward accepting civilian oversight 
and becoming a more “professional” force, but the politicized nature of the military 
leadership returned after Thaksin entered office.  The blatant support by Thaksin for his 
classmates in the promotion process revived a latent loyalty in some military leaders to 
the monarchy and the traditional elites.  Despite the efforts over the last decade-and-a-
half to become less political, the military by 2006 was again factionalized and political.  
1. Military Competence 
Despite the discredit of 1992, the military remained a competent institution within 
Thailand.  Through the 1990s, the military retained prominence in defense policy making 
and limited the elected government’s influence on the military promotions process.129  
The military further increased its role in Foreign Affairs with neighbors Laos and 
Cambodia, and in low-level projects of development, within the check of the elected 
officials.130  With the end of the Cold War, the military signaled that it would broaden its 
definition of national security beyond anticommunism to include the economy and social 
security.131  Throughout the 1990s and the 1997 constitutional changes, Thailand’s state 
structure, and the military as a part of it, remained a strong force within Thai society.   
Part of the military’s competence came from its remaining within its domain.  The 
military removed itself from direct political roles.  The military’s strategy for survival 
was to avoid “direct political involvement and concentrate on the protection of the 
military’s legitimate role and corporate interests.”132  The military recognized that a 
limited role in politics was good for its interests and internal stability.  Social unrest in 
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Thailand, according to the National Security Plan of 1997–2001, was believed to be the 
result of a decaying political system and poor policy implementation; good governance 
and partnership for national power were necessary for security.133  Not only was the 
military less interested in a direct political role, the business class and monarchy created a 
political environment that would permit greater civilian control over the military.134  The 
military retreated from a direct role in politics through the 1990s and remained a viable 
institution into the 2000s.   
2. Politicized Military and Affronts to Values 
The military took a less direct political role between 1992 and 2006, but overt 
factional politics emerged again among the military leadership in the Thaksin era.  In a 
sense, Thailand’s military never really depoliticized.135  A strong connection remained 
through the 1990s between the military and the civilian leadership, primarily through 
Prem’s patronage network.136  Prem was “Senior Statesman” considered above politics, 
but had strong connections to business and the Democrat Party.137  During the second 
administration of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (1997–2001), Prem’s influence was 
believed to be behind the appointment of General Surayud Chulanot as Army 
Commander; Surayud institutionalized reforms against corruption and centralized 
procurement.138  Prem had laid a foundation of support within the military, which 
continued regular, merit-based promotions: “By 2001, senior military reshuffles were 
being actuated almost completely through Prem’s signing off on them.”139  The military 
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leaders, who took a less direct political role, became loyal to the dominant political 
influence in Thailand, the network monarchy led by Prem. 
When Thaksin entered office as Prime Minister, he had learned the lessons of 
Prime Ministers Sarit Thanarat and Chatichai Choonhawan, recognizing the need to have 
the support of the military.140  Starting in 2001, the military promotion process became 
much more explicitly political when Thaksin sought support for his former classmates 
from Class 10.141  Several officers considered Thaksin supporters were promoted to 
general after being colonels for only a year.142  Also in 2001, General Surayud, Prem’s 
Army Commander since 1997, was placed in the largely ceremonial position of Supreme 
Commander.143  By 2003, Thaksin had his brother-in-law appointed as Army 
Commander; this was the first time a three star was promoted to full general after only a 
year.144  Thaksin also sought military support by increasing its budget and extending his 
network of influence to the lower ranks: “Thaksin was engaged in helping the military 
move beyond the dark years that had followed Black May [1992 uprising], supporting 
their rehabilitation and acknowledging the salience of their political and economic 
roles.”145  This challenged Prem’s dominant role as de facto military caretaker.   
Prem’s continued influence sought to balance Thaksin’s overt politicizing of the 
military and gave support to those loyal to the traditional elites.  In 2005, Prem insisted 
on the appointment to Army Commander of General Sonthi Boonyarataklin.146  A key 
supporter of Sonthi was the First Infantry Division Commander in Bangkok, Lt-General 
Aunupong Phaochinda.147  Aunupong, though a classmate of Thaksin, had previously 
served as a Commander of the Queen’s Guard.  Indicating the significance of his 
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association to the monarchy, Aunupong’s ascendency to Army Commander after the 
2006 coup marked a rise within the military of a unified, royalist faction.148  The 
promotion of Class 10 officers aligned with Thaksin had frustrated the more senior 
officers who were loyal to the influence of the network monarchy.  The political nature of 
the military resurfaced: “Under Thaksin, the supposedly ‘bypassed’ Thai military – who 
had actually been woven by Prem into an ingenious web of patronage, with support from 
the palace and the Democrats—emerged from the political closet.”149  The rise in rhetoric 
supporting the monarchy leading up to the Diamond Jubilee in 2006 gave the royalist 
supporters the emphasis necessary to stand against the government.150  The social 
movements supporting the king, as described below, gave backing to the military leaders 
who felt Thaksin threatened the prominence of the monarchy as an institution.151  Some 
military leaders feared the influence on Thaksin and his policies by former communists 
and activists who returned to politics during the opening political space in the 1980s.152 
Prem’s address to the graduating class of the military academy in June of 2006 
(during the time of the interim administration after the April elections were nullified, a 
topic addressed in more detail below) stressed to the cadets that the military belonged to 
the king and not to the government.153  The rise in royalist support among the military 
leaders countered the faction of Thaksin supporters. 
Thaksin’s influence over the state went far beyond military appointments.  
Thaksin also remapped the bureaucratic structure, increasing the number of ministries 
from 14 to 20; he removed the Budget Bureau’s command over the budget, increasing the 
cabinet ministers’ authority over the funds; he sidelined the National Economic and 
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Social Development Board; and he appointed businessmen to positions normally held by 
officials.154  The king had also lost favor of Thaksin.  Any favor Thaksin had in 2001 
from the monarchy was gone by 2002, over concern with Thaksin’s meddling in royal 
family affairs and his business connections with the king’s family members.155  As early 
as his birthday speech in December 2001, the king commented on the “egoism” and 
“double-standards” of Thaksin’s government; Prem further warned Thaksin about his 
double standards in 2005 and many times in between.156  Handley argues that Thaksin’s 
strength in his political position could have influenced the royal succession process.157  
In this way and other, Thaksin challenged the interests and values of the traditional 
elites—the bureaucrats and the monarchy.   
Thaksin’s effort to gain military support through increased budgets and 
promotions had the ironic effect of supporting his own ousters.  With the blatant re-
politicizing of promotions within the military, “Instead of marking the triumph of 
Thailand’s private sector over its moribund military and bureaucracy, Thaksin’s rule 
celebrated the kind of distasteful structural corruption that had characterized earlier 
periods of Thai politics.”158  The military leaders, who were loyal to the monarchy and 
frustrated by the re-politicizing of promotions, aligned their values to those of other 
traditional elites, who supported the network monarchy system that existed before the 
democratic reforms.  The traditional elites may have accepted the reforms of the 1997 
Constitution, but a corrupt, exceptionally wealthy businessman who was consolidating 
power now compromised their influence in the system.  Opposing Thaksin now meant 
aligning under the traditional institutions of leadership, particularly the network 
monarchy and its military supporters.   
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D. THAKSIN’S ADMINISTRATION 
Thaksin entered office in 2001 under a populist appeal but with an agenda to 
promote his own business interests, which in turn supported his political ambitions.  
Thaksin dominated the electoral system and through patronage appointments created a 
grip on power over the government that furthered his authoritarian motives.  Although his 
government was quite responsive to the rural public and he had a strong hold on power, 
he corrupted the political process to such an extent that its institutions and processes were 
no longer a legitimate representation of the people.  The civil disobedience of the middle 
class could not remove this authoritarian-leaning leader, and instead created a political 
stalemate by constitutional crisis.   
1. Civilian Incompetence 
The incompetence of the Thaksin administration was the erosion of the 
democratic process and its legitimacy.  Thaksin exploited the power of the executive for 
populist policies and for personal gain.  The strength of the office also permitted Thaksin 
to manipulate the political system to ensure his party would remain in power, but the 
corruption of the elections and independent bodies undermined the democratic process.  
The government also used its strength in campaigns that violated human rights and civil 
liberties.  Thaksin’s exploitation of the power of his office reflected his sense of authority 
over the government and ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the democratic process. 
In 2001, Thailand’s state remained a strong institution run by bureaucrats, but the 
new electoral system helped legitimate new politicians who were placed at the top rather 
than the traditional elites.  Politics had not changed much because money still decided 
who won elections and politicians still were not very representative of the people who 
elected them.159  Money politics with populist programs though enabled the Thai Rak 
Thai Party to have an unusually strong position in the elected parliament.  The 
bureaucracy that had been created to serve the centralized state now had a new, powerful 
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leadership that used the strength of the state institutions to further its own interests and 
power.  Thaksin ran the country like a company, ready to mobilize any national asset, and 
the bureaucratic processes in place were inhibiting.160  The public initially welcomed his 
direct methods of governance.  The Thaksin government failed to become actual 
representatives of the people, however, and refused to respond to the opposition’s 
demands and reach compromise.  By 2006, the middle class withdrew its support when 
the regime appeared more authoritarian than representative.   
Thaksin gained public support by offering economic and social programs that 
were presented as supporting Thai values and offered an acceptable alternative to what 
appeared to be the ineffective government that handled the financial crisis of 1997 and 
the subsequent prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund that had frustrated so 
many in Thailand.  “Thaksinomics” on its face promoted local businesses, local 
governance, and “Thai ingenuity.”161  Thaksin determined what was important to the 
populace and used the constitutionally reformed powers of the executive to deliver 
efficiently on campaign promises.162  Thaksin’s direct approach worked: “Indeed, some 
of Thaksin’s popularity may even have lain in his very abasement of democratic 
procedures, catering to the impatience of his constituents.”163  The character by which 
Thaksin accomplished his goals while in office was initially popular, but the directness of 
his leadership also revealed a sense of personal authority over the state and undermined 
participatory democracy. 
Thaksin’s administration took advantage of the strong powers granted to the 
executive office by the 1997 Constitution, in business and security issues, which brought 
criticism from the opposition parties and the network monarchy, leading them to portray 
him as dishonest and disloyal to the nation.  A few key events demonstrate Thaksin’s use 
                                                 
160  Phongpaichit and Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, 101–3. 
161  Ibid., 115. 
162  William Case, “Democracy’s Quality and Breakdown: New Lessons from Thailand,” (working 
paper, Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series (no. 83), City University of Hong Kong, 
2007), 13,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a780835521 (accessed February 8, 
2011). 
163  Ibid., 17. 
 59
of his executive powers for personal gain.  Thaksin’s wealth came as a result of earlier 
governments granting concessions to his businesses, particularly Shin Corp in the 
telecommunications industry.164  In addition to supporting some of the common people’s 
needs and promoting local businesses, Thaksin heavily promoted his own business 
interests, granting monopoly concessions for his companies.165  This compelled investors 
to add as much as a one-third premium to the value of the shares associated with him.166   
Thaksin also used his power to weaken civil liberties and commit human rights 
abuses.  He “embarked on several campaigns which have negative consequences for civil 
rights/civil liberties and which ultimately call into question the very nature of Thailand’s 
political reforms.”167  The 2003 War on Drugs saw an estimated 2,637 extrajudicial 
killings by government-affiliated gunmen shooting alleged drug dealers.168  In 2004, the 
counterinsurgency campaign in the Malay-Muslim southern provinces also witnessed the 
heavy hand of the military when militants took refuge inside the sacred Kru Ze mosque in 
April 2004.  The subsequent raid on and deaths of the significantly outmatched militants 
caused much criticism for the army, whose local commanders remained unquestioning in 
its decision.  The raid deepened misunderstandings between the army and the Malay-
Muslims.  The decision to carry out the raid raised questions about the chain of command 
within the army.  In October 2004, the army shot at protesters who gathered at Tak Bai, 
killing seven.  To transport other protestors out of the area, the army bound their arms 
behind them and stacked them laying on top of each other as many as eight high in the 
back of trucks for several hours; 78 died from suffocation.  These two events in particular 
discredited the army with the Southern population.  Army investigations revealed that the 
hard line tactics were not effective.  International reports about the incidents heavily 
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criticized Thaksin, Thailand, and its military.169  The strong executive powers of the 
Prime Minister gave Thaksin a strong hand in governance, but the use of those for 
personal gain and extrajudicial use of force lowered his support among the middle class 
and civil society groups. 
Thaksin’s corruption of the political system and abuse of executive power 
reflected his sense of authority.  Major features of the 2001 election that brought him to 
power were the traditionally used electioneering methods of vote buying, manipulation, 
patronage networks, and intimidation.170  As a result of the 1997 constitutional reforms, 
however, the Thai Rak Thai was the first party to achieve an actual majority in Thailand’s 
parliament.  Thaksin then sought to build a grand majority in the government to 
marginalize the role of factional leaders.171  The Democrat Party was eventually the only 
opposition party remaining, and it did not have enough seats to call for a vote of no 
confidence when Thaksin’s policies were questionable.172  Thaksin wanted a one-party 
system like in Singapore.173  He used the traditional patronage networks and government 
concessions to build the TRT support within parliament.  Thaksin made patronage 
appointments to the organizations that were intended to be independent oversight of the 
government, and these appointments compromised the organizations’ ability to challenge 
the elected government.174  By the 2005 election, the benefits of office were enough that 
direct vote buying was no longer as necessary because the politicians accepted the 
promises of government expenditures.175  Thaksin understood the election results as a 
popular mandate for his policies and, taking that a step further, as his right to determine 
the will of the people, rather than his duty to carry out the people’s will.  He combined 
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the Western concept of social contract with politics from modern Buddhist thinking, 
claiming that he was the good, disinterested leader who could determine what is best for 
the country.  Within this concept, opposition was viewed as illegitimate.176  Thaksin 
further ensured an unchallenged position over the government by politicizing the 
independent bodies intended to oversee the political process.  After the 2001 election, the 
appointments to the Election Commission were highly politicized, and the problematic 
2001 ruling from the Constitutional Court on Thaksin’s accused corruption undermined 
judicial legitimacy and illustrated the failure to embrace genuine demonstrate democratic 
reforms.177  Thaksin entered office with a wide base of support, and the success of the 
elections and his vast resources permitted his party to influence the political so much so 
that Thaksin could remain in power indefinitely and with little challenge. 
The results of the popular elections in 2001 and 2005 supported Thaksin’s ideas 
about running the government.  Thaksin used the strong power of the executive for his 
populist policies, but he also used them for personal gain and for manipulating the 
political system, both of which strengthened his power in office.  The consolidation of 
power under a single party and the government campaigns that negatively affected civil 
liberties created problems for democratic consolidation.  What was occurring was the 
tyranny of the majority.178  The weakness of the opposition in government did not permit 
a political counter, so those opposing the government sought extra-constitutional means, 
resulting in a political stalemate. 
2. Political Stalemate 
The corruption of the democratic system and the abuse of power made many 
enemies for Thaksin, who did not view the political system as capable of fixing the 
problems.  The boycott of to the April 2006 election by opposition groups prevented the 
elections of ministers to a new government.  A political stalemate occurred when 
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government was unable to form.  The Thaksin administration had corrupted the 
democratic system enough that the support for the system eroded underneath it.  The 
inability to form a government permitted the rising royalist support in the military to gain 
a stronger political position, which would be key during the interim government 
immediately prior to the September 2006 Coup. 
The 2005 election was another landslide victory for Thaksin.  Thai Rak Thai won 
an overwhelming number of seats with considerable use of illicit means.179  Soon after 
the election, a new political movement, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) 
demonstrated in mass protests in Bangkok in opposition to Thaksin and TRT.  Led by a 
business and economic rival to Thaksin, Sondhi Limthngkul, the PAD took up the 
royalist cause, an effective means to gain public support because it appears to be above 
politics.180  In January 2006, Sondhi’s cause gained further support after Thaksin sold his 
shares in Shin Corp and satellite technology for an enormous profit without paying taxes 
on it.181  This event, while within the letter of the law, gave the opposition an example of 
how Thaksin was not loyal to the nation even ostensibly putting national security at risk.  
In an effort to shore up his electoral support against the PAD demonstrations, Thaksin 
called for elections in April 2006.   
Rather than proposing opposition candidates, the PAD led a successful campaign 
for people to officially vote for none of the candidates on the ballot.  By the laws under 
the 1997 Constitution, an unopposed candidate needed 20 percent consent by the voters.  
Concerned that the candidates would not receive the necessary 20 percent, the TRT 
illegally entered candidates who were paid to be the opposition.182  Despite the activities 
of the TRT, the none-of-the-above campaign was successful in its goal, and by the end of 
April many ministers remained unelected.  TRT still won 56 percent of the party list 
seats, a significant decline from the 2005 election, but the government could not form 
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without all of the ministers.183  After a meeting with the king following the April 
election, Thaksin conceded to stepping down from Prime Minister in an apparent attempt 
to reconcile the results.  In May, the Constitutional Court followed the king’s earlier call 
to resolve the situation of the “undemocratic election,” nullified the results, and 
scheduled re-elections for October.184  Thaksin soon after decided to remain as caretaker 
Prime Minister and head of his party until the re-elections.185  However, Thaksin had no 
constitutional authority to take this action.186  Further, other constitutional problems 
arose for the election scheduled in October.  There was no Election Commission ready to 
oversee the election; in its absence the Senate oversees the election, but there was no 
Senate formed either.  The judiciary was left without a constitutional means to ensure an 
election.  The boycott of the election and the loss of support for Thaksin from party 
members resulting from the demonstrations created a political deadlock. 
The political stalemate resulted from the lack of commitment to the democratic 
process by both the Thaksin government and the opposition.  This problem with the 
political structure was noted as early as 2002.187  That the opposition parties took to 
demonstrations and boycotts further undermined the quality of the democracy in 
Thailand, already weakened by Thaksin’s authoritarian leanings.188  Neither side 
genuinely sought to promote and abide by the democratic process.  What was at stake 
was the competition for power between a Thaksin-led, capitalist-based, popularly 
supported network of patronage through government concessions and a traditional elite  
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and opposition parties that espoused the defense of the monarchy against extreme 
corruption.  This stalemate set the stage for a threat to the military’s interests enough so 
to precipitate a coup. 
E. IMMEDIATE CAUSES: THREATS TO MILITARY INTERESTS 
Politics in Thailand in 2006 included a backdrop of rising royalist support in the 
military and in groups opposed to the Thaksin government, a corrupted political system 
mired in deadlock, and latent concerns about royal succession.  As in 1991, the reshuffle 
of military leaders again took a prominent role.  Thaksin’s proposed appointments were a 
direct threat to the interests of the royalist supporters and reflected the tactics Thaksin 
was willing to use to remain in power.  In this context, the royal-supporting military 
stepped in, using the known repertoire of the coup, to save the nation from an 
authoritarian-leaning leader.  
As some of the middle class and the monarchy withdrew its support for Thaksin 
during 2006, the military also made its initial moves to check his power.  During the 
demonstrations by the PAD, Thaksin sought military support for declaring a state of 
emergency.  As Army Commander and Prem supporter, General Sonthi recognized that 
the outcry from the public against the military could be used by Thaksin to remove him 
from the Army Commander post, so Sonthi kept Thaksin at bay.189  In July 2006, Prem 
delivered a speech to the graduating cadets about the loyalty of the military belonging 
with the king and not the government; one week later, a midyear military reshuffle 
reappointed mid-ranking officers, who could be considered Thaksin supporters, to units 
without fighting troops.190  As the October election approached, Sonthi’s intelligence 
agency learned of an upcoming PAD demonstration that was likely to turn violent.191  
Such an event would have given Thaksin his opportunity to declare emergency powers, 
and his proposed military reshuffle in August would have supported Thaksin’s authority.   
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The 2006 proposed reshuffle of military leaders benefited Thaksin more than 
previous years’ reshuffles.  Thaksin attempted to promote his ally, Maj-General Prin 
Suwannthat, from First Infantry Brigade to the Division Commander in Bangkok and to 
place Maj-General Prin’s ally, Maj-General Daopong Ratanasuwan, as Commander of 
First Infantry.  As long-term Thailand correspondent Shawn Crispin noted: “With 
assistant army commander Pornchai Kranlert in place, the reshuffle, if accomplished, 
would have given Thaksin an unbroken chain of command over crack troops responsible 
for Bangkok’s security.”192  This reshuffle would have locked Thakin’s control over the 
military at the center of power.  If a state of emergency were declared with willing 
military support, Thaksin would have had complete control over Thailand. 
Army Commander Sonthi had been put in place at Prem’s insistence in 2005 and 
had the support of the First Infantry Division Commander in Bangkok, Lt-General 
Aunupong and Lt-General Saphrang Kalayanamit of the Third Army.  To avert the PAD 
demonstration and what would be Thaksin’s subsequent declarations and promotions, the 
army staged its coup.  Thaksin was in New York at a UN conference, and his local 
military supporters were unable to move; troops from the upcountry were also 
mobilized.193  Despite these military leaders being reluctant to assume political power, 
the check on the factional balance of military power within Bangkok during the political 
stalemate proved to be too much of a threat to the interests of the royalists.  The bloodless 
coup again followed its historical format.   
F. ANALYSIS 
1. Factors Present 
Although the factors that led to the 2006 had a different character, the 
contributing elements were similar to the coup of 1991.  The three principles of Koonings 
and Krujit’s political army—birthright, civilian incompetence, and military 
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competence—resurfaced for the 2006 coup.194  Karsten’s conditions for military coups 
that threaten elected governments again included political stalemate, affronts to military 
values, and direct threats to the military’s interests.195  Not one of these conditions alone 
would suffice for the coup, but the combination of the factors was necessary. 
On the face of the situation in Thailand by 2006, Koonings and Krujit’s factors 
would not necessarily appear relevant.  The Thaksin administration appeared quite 
powerful.  People were wary of the military being directly involved in politics after the 
events of 1992, and the military appeared to return to the barracks and accept civilian 
control.  However, the reality proved quite different.  The civilian government came into 
power using democratic forms but was again unable to institutionalize as representatives 
of the people and to establish a political process that permitted a vibrant opposition.  The 
strength of Thaksin’s government and the corruption of the democratic processes 
eventually eroded the quality of the constitutional system.  Democratic consolidation 
under the elected leaders was in doubt.  The opposition, with some middle class support, 
also went outside of the political process and called on the institutions of the monarchy 
and military to remove Thaksin’s government.  The military remained a competent 
institution through the 1990s, particularly in areas of Foreign Ministry and defense 
politics.  The military also benefited from the connections to the network monarchy under 
Prem and the spoils of Thaksin’s courting.  Although the military appeared to move 
toward accepting civilian control, factions developed when the promotions process 
became expressly politicized under Thaksin and royalist rhetoric surged at the time of the 
Diamond Jubilee.  Military leaders, particularly from the Queen’s Guard, were still more 
sympathetic to the national institution of the monarchy than to the democratic process.  
The monarchy, the pillar of the nation that had established the strength of the state in 
Thailand using the military’s support and gave legitimacy to the military’s leadership 
over so many decades, still retained the military’s support.  Each of Kooning and Krujit’s 
principles for a political army were met for the 2006 coup. 
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Similarly, the set of conditions presented by Karsten occurred in 2006 as had in 
1991.  A political stalemate ensued when the opposition also rejected the constitutional 
process for electing leaders and caused a political deadlock.  The values of the royalist 
military leaders aligned with those of the traditional elites of Thailand’s politics, which 
Thaksin challenged through his grip on electoral authority and strong use of the executive 
office over the bureaucracy.  Thaksin valued his personal control over the government 
and its processes, but the military leaders valued the processes and politics 
institutionalized by the network monarchy prior to Thaksin’s election.  The interests of 
the military leaders in position were directly threatened with Thaksin’s plan to lock in 
security over Bangkok by aligning the military reshuffle in his favor.  The conditions 
were present such that the threat posed by the reshuffle could precipitate a coup.   
2. Factors Not Present for the 2006 Coup 
Karsten’s factors of economic distress and political corruption were again not 
relevant to the timing of the coup.  For the factor of economic distress, the military 
stepped in at a time when economics were strong.  During the financial crisis of 1997, the 
external pressure from the IMF for reform supported the move to democracy; although 
the military resisted some of the changes, a coup was not staged then.196  By 2006, 
Thailand was no longer under the microscope of the IMF.  Under Thaksin, Thailand’s 
economy grew stronger, with GDP growth rates of 1.9 percent in 2001, 5.3 percent in 
2002, and 6.7 percent in 2003; “Thaksinomics” appeared to be a new economic model for 
Thailand’s growth and possible competition with China.197  During the first six months 
of 2006, the political turmoil caused a nine percent drop in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand, but the annual GDP was still expected to be up by 3.5 percent.198  Thailand was 
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still economically strong and growing.  In comparison, the financial shock of 1997 was a 
period of much greater economic distress.  While the military opposed some of the 
reforms set by the 1997 Constitution, no coup occurred at that time when the balance of 
political forces favored steps toward democracy.199  Thus, neither economic downturn 
nor democratization per se caused a coup. 
Corruption as a factor in 2006 was similar to what it had been in 1991.  
Corruption was pervasive and had eroded the quality of the democratic process.  When 
the factions came together against Thaksin in 2006, they also sought means outside of the 
Constitution to remove Thaksin from power, appealing to the monarchy and the military.  
The Shin Corporation sale was seen as an example of Thaksin’s disloyalty to the nation 
rather than simply unacceptable corruption.  Many of Thaksin’s corrupt business 
practices had occurred well before the Shin Corp. sale.  The general public accepted 
many of the human rights abuses from the government as part of its efficiency.  The 
royalist supporters claimed defense against the authoritarianism of Thaksin, not against 
his corruption.  The military and elite supporters were concerned about the loss of their 
influence over the government.  Thaksin’s practices gradually made enough enemies and 
provided justification for demanding his removal, but the practices themselves were not 
the issue.  Instead, the issue was his consolidation of power and ability to enact his will 
over the government.   
3. Counterfactuals 
Thaksin appeared to have a solid lock on the political system.  The new political 
structure of the 1997 Constitution created a strong executive role to counter the instability 
of earlier periods.  The patronage networks were still able to put elected politicians into 
office, and the independent bodies were also corruptible.  Thaksin extended his patronage 
network to the military and the bureaucracy.  The landslide victories of the Thai Rak Thai 
appeared to ensure that Thaksin’s hold on power would remain.   
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The grip on power by Thaksin challenged the traditional elites at a sensitive time.  
The network monarchy grew concerned about Thaksin’s influence on the succession of 
the monarchy.  Had the monarchy as an institution not perceived Thaksin’s power as a 
threat, the influence on the military promotions by the network monarchy would likely 
have been unnecessary.  The rise of the royalist support, however uncoordinated, would 
likely have not have been able to claim Thaksin was disloyal to the central institution to 
Thailand. 
The overt repoliticizing of promotions challenged the military as an institution.  
Although Prem retained his influence within the promotion process, the system was 
agreeable to those within it.  Thaksin’s support from his classmates could likely have 
lasted the time necessary for them to make regular promotions.  However, when Thaksin 
began to overtly appoint his supporters above more senior officers, support emerged for 
the institutionalized process established by the network monarchy prior to Thaksin.  
Thaksin could potentially have retained support in the ranks with the increased budget 
and lower-level patronage.  Alternatively, Thaksin could have appealed to the interests of 
those bypassed leaders by providing them good positions outside of the military, in 
businesses or other ministries.  By 2006, the military was reluctant to step in.  Had the 
factions not repoliticized so strongly, the urgency of the coup at its timing may not have 
been recognized.   
What would have most certainly avoided the coup, but was least likely to occur, 
was adherence to the constitutional process.  Thaksin had clearly corrupted the process, 
but the opposition groups sought extraconstitutional means for a change in power because 
they recognized they could not win in the elections.  Had the opposition run candidates 
such that an election could be valid, the political stalemate and constitutional deadlock in 
the Parliament would not have occurred.  The legal conundrum provided some 
justification for the action, as no constitutional means remained for resolving the 
deadlock.  Otherwise, the military would have had to step in against the constitutionally 
elected government, which it seemed reluctant to do.  While the Thaksin government was 
certainly turning authoritarian, calling on the military to oust the government throws out 
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the entire democratic process.  Commitment to the democratic process by the opposition 
groups would have limited the calls for the monarchy and military to step in. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Thaksin’s administration shifted toward a popularly elected authoritarianism and 
permitted an opposition group to claim this government as disloyal to the monarchy and 
the nation.  The civilian incompetence was the abuse of executive power for personal 
gain, the failures of internal security in the Southern regions, and the inability of the 
government to accept opposition within the political framework.  Rising royalist support 
sought to counter Thaksin’s strong influence over the government but went outside of the 
democratic process.  Political stalemate resulted from the extra constitutional means by 
the opposition in the boycott that resulted in no government being able to form.  Royalist 
support within the military leadership, a result of network monarchy influence before the 
Thaksin administration, reemerged when the promotions were blatantly repoliticized by 
Thaksin.  The royalist supporters in the military had values that aligned with traditional 
elites, who were challenged by Thaksin’s rising power and ability to enact his will over 
the government.  The proposed military reshuffle of 2006, just prior to the October 
reelection, would have given Thaksin unchecked control over security in Bangkok.  With 
the democratic process unable to counter Thaksin’s influence, the royalist military 
leaders’ interests were threatened.  The military leaders felt compelled to step in to save 
the nation.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Why did the Thai military intervene in 1991 and 2006 to take over the political 
process by replacing civilian executive leaders with its generals after significant strides 
toward consolidating democracy, the seemingly widespread adoption of democratic 
values in Thai society, and the development of a significant middle class and civil 
society?  What implication might this have for theories about civil-military relations in 
general and about coup d’états more specifically?  The dependent variable of this study is 
the presence and outcome of a military coup over an elected government.  The 
independent variables are the result of a complex mix of structural and cultural conditions 
present at the time of each coup.  These conditions have an underlying identity held by 
the military as the defender of the nation and its institutions, such that serious threats to 
them compel the military to take action.  The last two coups in Thailand have broader 
implications for the role of the military in governance and society in democratizing states, 
civil-military relations, and the future of political stability in Thailand: a coup requires 
more than a decision by the military leaders to take control of the political process.  
Structural and cultural conditions influence the military’s decision and permit—and even 
welcome—the coup leaders into power.   
The coups of 1991 and 2006 are different in character but similar in conditions.  
In 1991, military leaders with a traditional mindset of elite dominance over government 
and society attempted to reassert control over the political process; while temporary 
successful this ended with disastrous results in 1992 known as Black May for the 
massacre that took place on peaceful protestors seeking democratic reforms.  In 2006, the 
democratic process fell apart because the elected leader corrupted the institutions and the 
weakened opposition sought means outside of the constitutional process; a repoliticized 
military sought to reset the political process in favor of the network monarchy, which had 
overseen the government prior to this corrupted yet elected administration.  However, 
Neither of these characterizations offers the complete picture of how the military decided 
to step in.  A set of conditions was necessary to allow the coup to occur; the conditions 
are all necessary and only collectively sufficient. 
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The conditions surrounding both of the coups were similar.  In both events, the 
military acted as a “political army” as defined by Koonings and Krujit.200  Possessing a 
“birthright principle,” the military has a history in the foundation of the nation and 
considers itself the defender of the nation of last resort; thus its values are translated to 
the nation as a whole.  In 1991, the military valued the traditional position of a strong 
state in control of the political process.  In 2006, the military valued the leadership of the 
network monarchy that had institutionalized its processes during the 1990s, before the 
Thaksin administration.  Both the civilian Chatichai and Thaksin governments 
demonstrated incompetence in their leadership.  The technocratic incompetence and 
continual cabinet reshuffles by the Chatichai administration demonstrated that the ability 
to gain office was not enough to lead once there or to stay.  While Thaksin was initially 
well accepted for implementing his populist policies, the strength of his government—
and its use of corruption for personal gain and recurrent human rights abuses—
undermined some of the people’s support and demonstrated its incompetence.   
Finally, in both cases, the military was in a relatively strong, competent political 
position.  In 1991, the military had benefited from years of social entrenchment during 
the anticommunist campaign, in which the military liberalized politics, albeit cautiously.  
In 2006, the military had years of remaining within its domain, focusing on military-
specific issues without a direct role in politics.  The military had become the politically 
disinterested defender of the nation’s interests, but the blatant repoliticization of the 
promotion process by Thaksin exposed how traditional leaders preferred the regular, 
merit-based promotions under the Prem-led network monarchy period of the 1990s.  With 
the birthright principle, civilian incompetence, and military competence, Thailand’s 
military acted as a political army. 
Several factors provided by Karsten were also present for both coups.201  Before 
each event, the aforementioned civilian incompetence led to political stalemate.  In 1991, 
Chatichai formed three cabinets within four months in an attempt to retain power, but no 
coalition was stable enough to retain the legitimacy of elected office.  In 2006, the 
                                                 
200  Koonings and Kruijt, Political Armies. 
201  Karsten, “The Coup d’Etat in Competitive Democracies,” 223–250. 
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opposition to Thaksin in the April election caused a constitutional deadlock; Thaksin 
illegally declared himself caretaker Prime Minister; and the future election could not be 
assured against corruption.  Both governments prior to the coup had lost the support of 
the monarchy as a result of the incompetence and withdrawal of support from the 
Bangkok middle class.  The interests of the military, particularly in promotions, were 
threatened by each of the elected governments.  In 1991, the attempt to appoint General 
Arthit into the government would have checked the authority of General Suchinda and 
the unified Class Five leadership.  In 2006, the upcoming military reshuffle would have 
put Thaksin supporters within the military in charge of security around Bangkok.   
Finally, before both coups, the elected governments challenged the military’s 
values, which were generally aligned with traditional elites.  In 1991, General Suchinda 
and the Class Five leaders attempted to assert the authority of the military over the 
political system as had been done so often in Thailand’s political history.  In 2006, 
several military leaders expressed their preference for the Prem-led, network monarchy 
system that preceded Thaksin’s authoritarian-leaning, populist, incompetent, and 
military-politicizing government.  For both coups, corruption provided a justification and 
underlying cause but was not actually resolved by the coup, so corruption per se cannot 
be considered a causal factor.  Also, the economy in Thailand was relatively strong at the 
time of each coup, and no coup occurred during the financial crisis of 1997–8; so 
economic distress cannot be considered a causal factor either. 
Different factors may have driven the coups in Thailand in 1991 and 2006, but the 
conditions that enable the coup to occur were similar.  Each of the factors were 
necessary: Karsten’s factors of political stalemate, threats to military interests, and 
affronts to military values; plus Koonings and Krujit’s notion of a political army derived 
from the birthright principle, civilian incompetence, and military competence shored up 
by military unity.  In 1991, the traditional values of the army led them to stage the coup; 
in 2006, the incompetence and breakdown of the elected political system compelled the 
army to stage the coup.  In either case, the one factor was not sufficient.  In both cases, 
the sum of the factors present enabled the coup.   
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Thailand’s military values itself as the defender of the nation.  In 1991, that sense 
drove the military to step in over the elected politicians.  In 2006, the breakdown of the 
election system again compelled the military to take action.  In both cases, the military 
justified its action as being good for the nation and was initially welcomed in each.  As 
the case of 2006 demonstrates, even when the military does not openly seek direct 
political leadership, the value of defending the nation may compel the military to step in 
when it feels such action is necessary.  This sense of necessity alone, however, is not 
sufficient; the other factors are necessary, too.  Further, a coup will not occur when a 
military has no sense of propriety in taking direct political leadership and will allow the 
elected leaders to fail in their role.   
Exploration on the nature of politics and democracy in Thai society is still 
necessary.  That the ideas of a “Thai-style democracy” persist may be informative of 
what direction the future of Thai politics may take.202  Further research into theories of 
legal foundations and democracy may also be informative to projecting how the current 
military-supported regime may shore up the underpinnings of democracy.  Thailand’s 
future acceptance of rule of law, which is central to a consolidated, well-functioning 
democracy, is complicated by the recurrence of coups.  As security scholar Edward 
Luttwak notes: “Some contemporary republics have ended in this position, which comes 
about when a long series of illegal seizures of power leads to a decay of the legal and 
political structures which are needed to produce new governments.”203  The occurrence 
of these coups is not only affected by the mindset of the military which conducts them, 
but also the structural and cultural conditions that support the military’s actions.  How 
Thailand’s society and politics can continue on the path to democracy without reliance on 
the military to oversee the process deserves further study.   
                                                 
202  Englehart, “Democracy and the Thai Middle Class,” 253. 
203  Edward Luttwak, Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1969), 215. 
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A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY204 
Thailand and the United States have a long-lasting and strong relationship.  Both 
nations value the other’s position in international relations.  The United States has even 
designated Thailand a Major NonNATO Ally.  The largest multinational exercise hosted 
by the United States, Cobra Gold, is hosted in Thailand.  The foundation of that 
relationship is the military to military ties between the nations.  From the 1940s, through 
the Vietnam War era, and into today, the relationship between the United States and 
Thailand has a military foundation that is important to both nations.   
The primary driver of the strong relationship between the United States and 
Thailand is the international balance of powers, particularly within Southeast Asia.  The 
significance of the mutual relationship for each nation is how the other is positioned 
within the international order.  Currently, Thailand views its interests as balancing 
influence from the United States and China.  Thailand understands that both the United 
States and China are large, economically powerful states with robust militaries and 
security interests in Southeast Asia.  The United States’ interest in Thailand is its 
geographic location and the desire to limit the encroachment of China’s interests in the 
region.  The long-standing history of good relations fosters this mutual vision about the 
balance of power in Southeast Asia and Asia more broadly.   
Thailand felt a strain on the nature of this relationship in the early 1990s.  At the 
end of the Cold War as the international order shifted, Thailand felt that the United States 
had withdrawn support from a loyal anticommunist nation.  Since that time, the 
relationship between the nations has strengthened again.  Thailand has committed its 
military to the goals of countering terrorism, human and drug trafficking, and other 
transnational crime as Western militaries have done in the past two decades.  Thailand 
has also supported the United States in its recent military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
                                                 
204  The ideas in this section are the product of several interviews conducted in Bangkok from 25 
February 2011 to 3 March 2011.  Those interviewed include United States military officers, a former 
director for an international organization and expert on Thailand’s politics, professors at Thammasat and 
Chulalongkorn Universities, an official at a government research office, a former senior officer in the Royal 
Thai military and politician, and a Thai government official.   
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Part of the nature of the mutual relationship between the United States and 
Thailand is respecting the other’s independence.  Domestic political instability in 
Thailand has affected the relationship with the United States, but this was a limited 
impact.  The United States withdrew military and financial support immediately 
following the 2006 coup.  The total number of exercises dipped in 2006, and, in 2007, the 
United States withdrew all funds for International Military Education and Training 
(IMET).  The United States restored support once an election occurred in late 2007.  The 
total number of exercises increased in 2007, and by 2008 exercises were above pre-coup 
levels; IMET funding returned to reduced levels in 2008.205  In the absence of the support 
from the United States, China is willing and able to increase its support without the 
conditions on Thailand’s political system.  Thailand understands the United States’ 
reasons for withdrawing support following a coup and how the ideal of democracy fits 
into the United States’ foreign policies.  The withdrawal of support by the United States, 
or even concerns about its loss, was not a factor in the coup decision.  Thailand is 
interested in maintaining a strong relationship with the United States but considers the 
domestic political situation independent of their relationship.   
Thailand is independently committed to promoting democracy and understands 
itself to be on a path of development that may have some backward steps along the 
way.206  The friction along the path is not an objection to democracy per se, but the 
problems reflect a desire to maintain social stability and national independence.  
Following a coup, the interest in Thailand to returning to normal diplomatic and military-
to-military relations with the United States creates some pressure to return to democratic 
processes.  While this pressure exists, the United States should not overestimate its 
influence on Thailand’s politics from its military and financial support because the 
support from China is still available in the absence of the United States.   
The United States should not be deterred from its strong relationship with 
Thailand due to domestic political instability.  None of the leaders on any sides of the 
                                                 
205  Data from JUSMAGTHAI brief to U.S. Ambassador, January 13, 2011.  Total exercises (includes 
bilateral and multilateral) by year—2005:41, 2006:33; 2007:37; 2008:46.  2006 included an increase in 
multilateral exercises but a decreases in bilateral. 
206  Interview conducted with Thailand government official, March 2, 2011.   
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political spectrum are interested in breaking ties with the United States, so domestic 
political instability should not threaten the relationship with the United States.  Although 
China may continue support of Thailand through the instability, Thailand is not interested 
in a dominant Chinese influence.   
While the United States has Western notions of professional military role and 
Thailand has a different notion of what is meant by a professional military, these do not 
distract from their willingness or ability to support each other in international affairs, 
security issues, economic development, and democratization.   
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